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PREFACE
For all of the symbolic importance attached to the dispute
between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson in Washington's first
Cabinet, it was still a highly personal political and economic
argument.

Vital elements in the personalities of both men go far in

explaining the rancorous nature of the dispute after July, 1792.
What began as a philosophical disagr~ement over specific issues
became an embittered personal controversy which outran any possibility
of compromise.

To George Washington himself fell the dubious role

of serving as an tmwilling catalyst in that personal feud.

At the

same time the three men had no precedents available from which to
guide their behavior or out of which to fashion possible solutions.
The purpose of this thesis is to 'delineate the various elements
of personality which contributed to the dispute and to relate those
elements to the political and economic milieu in which they ftmctioned.
This writer, however, does not intend to neglect the issues, for many
insights into personality can be gained from a scrutiny of the
political and economic spheres.
A necessary corollary to the general purpose of this work is
an analysis of the historiography of the controversy.

Historians on

the whole have been guilty of escalating the dispute to a symbolic
level, either making no mention of personality, or regarding its
injection into the dispute as the fault and folly of one or the other
of the combatants.

This writer proposes to treat much of the

2

secondary data as primary source material, supporting the subsidiary
argument that personality has mistakenly been shunted aside.

The

confrontation will be htnnanized and divested of much of its symbolism
in an attempt not to decry the latter, but to emphasize that the
feud was first of all between two men of distinct personalities and
philosophies.

Running throughout the following pages is the attempt

to explain how and why the personal elements emerged as the dominant
factor in the confrontation.
However, in delineating the facets of personality, several
preliminary tasks must be performed.

One is to define "personality"

as it is to be understood in the context of the following study.
Another is to set forth the key questions relating to personality.
Third is the determination of the connection between psychological
factors and those of a more purely historical nature.
As

a definition of "personality," I have chosen the following:

"The uniquely individual qualities that are manifested by a person
in his relations with his environment. 111 The focus here is upon
"unique." The unusual traits possessed by Jefferson and Hamilton,
brought into juxtaposition with strong political and philosophical
differences and given the necessary catalyst in George Washington,
rendered the dispute bitter and irreparable.
Key questions of personality are the subjective "signposts"
of the thesis.

One fundamental issue must be that of Hamilton's

origins--his illegitimate birth and his late arrival upon the American

Lloyd Saxton; The IrtdividualC :Marriage, and the Family (Belmont,
Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing o., 1968), p. 4S6.
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scene.

Was Alexander Hamilton's inordinate ambition and drive a

reflection of the desire to compensate for his backgrolllld and lack
of social status? Harold D. Lasswell in Power and Personality states
that political activity is often an outlet for ambition and a compensation for frustration.

The outlet is based upon "an intense and

llllgratified craving for deference" which cannot be satisfied in
personal life. 2 Lasswell does not suggest that all politicians
confonn to given "types." But his premise of a compensatory outlet
is highly applicable to a discussion of Hamilton, for his bastard
origin would by definition have excluded him from higher social
circles had he not achieved political stature.
Also applicable in the context of Hamilton's origin is the
question of Washington's personal relationship to him.

Was George

Washington indeed a father figure for Hamilton? John C. Miller notes
that during the .American Revolution, Washington did express a paternal
affection for Hamilton.

Hamilton responded by trying to keep him at

ann's length.3
Of complementary importance is Hamilton's late arrival on
the .American scene--1772.

David Hackett Fischer maintains that

Hamilton's "social and geographic origins" go far in explaining even
his failure to gain rapport with other Federalists.

By 1772 the

dispute with Great Britain had already reached the point of no return.
Hamilton had a good deal of grolllld to cover in asserting himself in any

2.

Harold D. Lasswell quoted in John A. Garraty, The Nature of
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 237.

3.

John C. Miller, Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation
(New York: Harper &Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 66-67.
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independent government.
stated:

Hamilton's friend, Gouverneur Morris,

"From his situation in early life, it was not to be

expected that he should have a fellow-feeling with those who idly
supposed themselves to be the natural aristocracy of this country. 114
There is also a need to ask several pertinent questions
concerning the origins of Thomas Jefferson.

The Secretary of State

was a man raised in a highly varied background.

His Williamsburg

education; his experience in agriculture, science, music and literature; and his own romantic nature placed him at a pole opposite
Hamilton.

He was an adherent to "the code of the Virginia gentleman."

Did this adherence cause him to condescend to Hamilton? Equally
important, did his own romantic nature enforce or even cause rejection
of Hamilton's coldly calculated economic policies?
Any answers to these questions require highly subjective
judgments.

Within this domain I propose to follow the advice of

John A. Garraty who has noted that there is no one formula for the
presentation of personality.

That entity can be understood "only

imperfectly, and that with great effort." The traditional types of
personality infonnation, introspective observations and corrnnents of
contemporaries, are at best contradictory and superficial.

Garraty

proposes several alternatives, which I have followed in varying
degrees.

The first is the use of imagination grounded in fact.

It

can be accepted by most scholars that an intensive study of
historical characters does lend some insight into their personalities.

4.

David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of .American Conservatism
(New York: Harper &Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 20.
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It remains for the imagination to graphically portray the personal
elements, within the scholarly bounds of the historical discipline.
Intuitive judgments comprise the second alternative.

These must

follow the examination of the sources, not precede it.

Third is the

use of psychological evidence; dangerous waters for anyone whose
training lies chiefly in the historical discipline! 5 In recognition
of these hazards my utilization of psychological data will be confined
to the more measurable patterns of behavior.
With this in mind, it is necessary to more precisely connect
these psychological devices with historical method.

Sidney Hook has

attempted to explain this connection in The Hero in History.

He

presents the analyst with the ingredients of psychological security,
compensatory behavior, vicarious satisfaction, and frustration--all
related to the times and climate of opinion.

Although his work deals

with the effects of "great men" upon their followers, many of his
concepts equally apply to the "great men" themselves.

Hook explains

much behavior in tenns of the need for psychological security, and
the tendency to seek compensation for personal and material limitations.
In times of stress "the stronger are the vestigial patterns of
dependence." The years 1791-92 were troubled times--a new government
in the most literal sense was being established without the aid of
political and economic precedents.
Coupled with the concept of troubled times is Hook's assertion
that since only a few men become vitally interested in politics,

5.

John A. Garraty, The Nature of Biography (New York:
Knopf, 1957), pp. 215-40.

Alfred A.
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political power becomes all the more easy to acquire and retain.
Hence political power can be a vicarious outlet, serving as compensation
for an individual deficient in material or social wealth.

But

paradoxically, few who have enjoyed power "have felt that its rewards
were connnensurate with the personal sacrifices it entailed. 116
tration often marks the possessor of political power.

Frus-

These elements

of security, vicarious achievements, frustration, and a troubled
climate of domestic issues provide the student with a connection
between behavior and the times in which it occurred.

Such a connection

will hopefully make this study a product of psychological insights
into three "great men" of history, who were products of a troubled
period.
Therefore the intended result of this study is a presentation
of the force of personality as the chief explanatory factor in the
dispute between Hamilton and Jefferson, and as~ chief factor in
Washington's role as unwilling catalyst.

The botmdaries will be the

historical discipline, utilizing the more measurable psychological
insights as given above.

The result will hopefully be an insightful

connection between personality, behavior, and history.
At this time I should like to express my sincere gratitude
for the rrruch-needed and incisive criticisms offered by my thesis
advisor, Dr. Thomas Waltennan.

His patience and suggestions are

largely responsible for any success attendant with this study.

I

should also like to thank Dr. Zoltan Kramar and Dr. Floyd Rodine, the

6.

Sidney Hook, The Hero in History (New York:
1943), pp. 20-26.

The John Day Co.,
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remaining members of my thesis committee who have sharpened my critical
and analytical capacities.

Finally I would like to thank my wife,

Vicki, whose patience and understanding have made the tedit.nn of writing
and rewriting easier to bear.

CHAPTER ONE

WHAT THE HISTORIANS HAVE- -AND HAVE NOT- -SAID
I

The most important dimension of the Hamilton-JeffersonWashington triumvirate is what historians have neglected to consider
about the Cabinet controversy.

No major writer has yet explained

the precise connection between personality and political behavior.
In descriptions of the Hamilton-Jefferson confrontation, personality
has been ignored in favor of constitutional issues.

To simply state

that the dispute's vehemence was "inevitable" is to beg the question.
The historian must explain why Jefferson and Hamilton were able to
work together on the issue of assumption, why the Bank dispute did
not precipitate an open break, and why Hamilton began to engage in
personal denigration in the public press following Freneau's
newspaper attacks.
A division into historiographical periods reveals a "wave

pattern" of interpretation.

Sidney Hook has noted the natural

tendency to associate all consequences of an economic or political
policy with its first fonnulator.

Men, historians not excluded, tend

to look for both saviors and demons in order to explain or damn
contemporary conditions. 1 Such tendencies lend considerable insight

1.

Sidney Hook, The Hero in History (New York:
1943), pp. 4-12.

The John Day Co.,
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into the "wave pattern" of views.

Historians writing around the turn

of the twentieth century were distinctly pro-Hamilton.

This group

includes John Spencer Bassett, Albert Bolles, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the
earlier John Marshall whose writing enjoyed a revival at this time.
Historians of the Progressive influence and those of the New Deal period
were largely of a pro-Jefferson bias:

Claude Bowers, Gilbert Chinard

(an instructor in French literature, not a historian), George Fort
Milton, Homer Carey Hockett, Adrienne Koch (from the 1960's), and Dumas
Malone.

Scholars writing in the 1950_ 1·s also revealed .a reversion to a

Hamiltonian bias, although more implicitly than their predecessors.
This group includes E. S. Corwin and Bray Hannnond.
generally reflect a more balanced view.

Writers of the 1960's

Included herein are John C.

Miller, Douglas Southall Freeman, William Nisbet Chambers, and Nathan
Schachner.

These categories are not definitive and are not mere

reflections of climate of opinion.

Rather, certain patterns of

interpretation result from these given periods, allowing the student
to arbitrarily define boundaries.
but they do of course overlap.

Such divisions facilitate discussion,

It is not the purpose of this study to

refute or support the theory that the popularity of each adversary is
simply a product of various historiographical periods.
II

Historians writing at the turn of this century fol.llld themselves in the culmination of a period of laissez faire economic growth.
Since the end of the Civil War, the government had often explicitly
supported the promotion of big business.

Thus the period seemed to

be a fulfillment of Hamilton's ideals and historians of the period
generally paid homage to the Hamiltonian system.

John Spencer Bassett;

writing in 1906, explained the feud as a rivalry based upon an
attempt for political mastery of the United States.

Jefferson's

opposition to Hamiltonian policies was born of a popular feeling
against England, gratitude toward France, love of state autonomy,
dislike of taxes, prejudice against monarchy and wealth, and support
of the people.

Hence Jefferson in his duplicity allowed Freneau's

attacks in the National Gazette to continue unabated in the hope of
arousing public wrath against the Secretary of the Treasury.

But

this view was as close as Bassett came to describing personality at
work.

Bassett found Washington simply a mediator who wrote letters

to both parties, in a futile attempt to maintain his ''bipartisan"
Cabinet.

Bassett never explained Washington's exact role in the

feud; what gave the controversy its later bitterness; or what
precise effect Jefferson's deceit had in the confrontation. 2
Writing in 1894, Albert Bolles revealed a disposition toward
Hamilton's financial policy.

The preservation of Hamilton's system

with only a few changes was "proof of its excellence." He dismissed
Jefferson's objections with contempt, imputing to him a profound
ignorance of finances.

In this context he found in Jefferson's

ignorance of financial matters the nexus of the dispute. 3
2.

3.

John Spencer Bassett, The Federalist System, 1789-1801, Vol. 11 of
the American Nation Series, ed. Albert Bushnell Hart (New York:
Harper &Brothers, 1906), pp. 3-55.
Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States from
1789 to 1860 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1969 c.
1894) II, 3-102, 103-108, 127-132, 156-161.
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Henry Cabot Lodge, writing in 1882, took Hamiltonian
predilections one step further--to complete idealization.

Lodge

pictured Hamilton accepting the Treasury post because "it was impossible
to escape his destiny." This view appeared again in Lodge's description
of the national bank plan.

He saw here a Hamiltonian attempt to

educate the public, assuming that the deluge of logic, figures, and
syllogistic reasoning would appeal to the agricultural public of
1791.

He obliquely approached the controversy between the two

Secretaries, asserting that Hamilton lost his temper in the "newspaper
war."

Lodge failed, however, to explain the causal chain which led

to the violent outburst of temper, Jefferson's role in hiring Freneau,
and the irreparable nature of the dispute.

To Henry Cabot Lodge

personality was a tangential issue. 4
In his biography of George Washington, Lodge took greater
notice of the motives in the Cabinet breach than he had in his work
on Hamilton.

He accused Jefferson of jealousy of Hamilton's leadership

in the Cabinet.

He also deemed it inevitable that the Secretary of

State should dislike Hamilton "for there never were two men more
unlike in character and in their ways of looking at things." While
recognizing several fundamental personality traits, e.g. jealousy,
boldness, imperiousness, Lodge nevertheless could not escape the
conclusion that ideology nrust have been more important.

As a result

he failed to make the connection between personality and politics.
The simple explanation of a "loss of temper" does little to explain
4.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, Vol. VII of the .American
Statesmen Series, ed. John T. Morse, Jr. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, &Co., 1882), pp. 84-116, 117-135, 136-152.
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such an extended controversy; for a loss of temper indicates a
temporary reaction, a violent response confined to a limited span of
time.

Hamilton's attacks covered a span of years, including anonymous
newspaper letters, bitter replies to Washington, and much, much more. 5
Perhaps the most realistic early view of the confrontation
came from the pen of John Marshall.

He noted that the strictures

against Washington's administration were directed largely against
Hamilton and his policies.

He pictured the rift between the two

Cabinet members as a chain reaction which acquired "a regular accession
of strength from cirClDllstances which were perpetually occurring, lllltil
it grew into open and irreconcilable hostility." Although Marshall
did not directly refer to personality, _he implied that the close
proximity of the two men, Washington's insistence upon "ministerial
consultation," and the confrontation over issues agitated the dispute
and caused it to build in vehemence.

He also insightfully noted

Hamilton's alienation from the people, though not within the context
of his origins. 6
III

The Jeffersonian bias is in many ways the product of the
Progressive influence and the New Deal period.

In both instances a

literary inclination was afoot urging the government to intervene in

5.

Henry Cabot Lodge, George Washington, Vol. V of the American
Statesmen Series, ed. John T. Morse, Jr. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, &Co., 1889), pp. 76-128, 216-231.

6.

John Marshall, The Life of George Washington (New York: Walton
Book Co., 1930), II, 236-37, 240-41, 270-73, 276-77, 292-94.
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the economy on behalf of the "forgotten man." The elites of wealth
which had grown up were seen as foul by-products of a system linked to
the economics of Alexander Hamilton.

Thomas Jefferson thus became

the representative of the common man, pictured as abhorring the
corrupt alliance of the wealthy creditor and the govenunent.
Writing in 1925, Claude Bowers asserted that Hamilton's
courting of the wealthy financial interests to the govenunent's
cause fostered speculation.

Hamilton, in Bowers' view, regarded

himself as "Prime Minister:" "His policies were the policies of the
govenunent." He also accused the Secretary of manifesting
"dictatorial airs," which offended Jefferson who favored "conciliation
and persuasion." The Bank dispute, he felt, portended a greater
rift because Hamilton could brook no opposition.
An

undercurrent of personality was implicit throughout

Bowers' work.

He deemed Jefferson the master of diplomacy and tact:

"quarrels and separations were minor tragedies to him." But
unfortunately Bowers too surrendered to symbolic abstraction.
Jefferson's chief attribute was his sensitivity to the undercurrent
of public opinion.

He noted the feeling of "democracy nmning through

the land." Jefferson recognized this current; Hamilton did not.

On

that basis Bowers explained Hamilton's defeat and Jefferson's victory.
Personality became a pejorative term in connection with the dispute.
To Bowers, Hamilton lost his dignity when he took up his pen as
"T. L." in the "newspaper war" and became personal in his reply to the
opposition.

Jefferson was above such behavior.

of personality ended here.

For Bowers the role

Jefferson's reaction was not grounded

upon shyness, aversion to the frontal attack, or even in duplicity.

14
Rather it lay in his belief that he was "the idol of the democrats
everywhere." This blatant symbolic description belied any possibility
of analyzing the causes of the feud's verbal violence. 7
Gilbert Chinard also dealt in abstractions.

Jefferson, as a

godlike creature in the assumption compromise, "was ready to sacrifice
his most cherished preferences on the altar of the Union."

Behind

Hamilton's policies was the futile hope of establishing a monard1y,
based on the British example.

However, Chinard did admit that whatever

Hamilton's ambitions were, monarchy simply was not in the national
current.

Both men, he stated, should have realized this "if they had

not been caught in the maelstrom of political and personal passions."
Sadly, Chinard did not delineate these "personal passions." His
preoccupation with Hamilton's British leanings may have been the
result of his scholarly background.

For Chinard was not an historian

but rather an instructor in French literature.

Since .Jefferson.was

in many ways a Franco-phile and an Anglo-phobe it is likely that
Chinard's French involvement made Jefferson an amenable character.
He no doubt found Hamilton all the more disgusting, for he was an
tmabashed Franco-phobe. 8
Gilbert Chinard is exceeded in his "Hamiltonphobia" by Dumas
Malone, Jefferson's most ardent admirer among American historians.
He described Jefferson's response to assumption as "thoroughly in
character with the modest, patriotic, and cooperative public servant
7.

Claude Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton:· The Struggle for Democracy
(Houghton Mifflin, &Co. 2 1925), pp. 48-115, 140-239.

8.

Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, the A ostle of Americanism
(Boston: Little, Brown &Co., 1929 , pp. 245-273.

15

he had always been." The bargain fit "into the pattern of Jefferson's
personality and working political philosophy during the New York period,
when he had not perceived the full implications of his colleague's
policy and was not yet distrustful of him as a public man." Yet
Jefferson later "did not exaggerate his colleague's ruthless aggressions
and lust for power"--Hamilton, said Malone, was a potential dictator!
In this same vein, Malone interpreted the Bank proposal and
the constitutional questions surrounding it.

In his view Hamilton

"seemed to be pressing relentlessly and irresistibly onward in his
march toward power." Jefferson as the "apostle of freedom" was
alarmed at the extreme claims of inherent national power harbored
by Bank advocates.

Malone even denigrated Washington's role in the

constitutional dispute:

Washington "had no confidence in his own

judgment in constitutional matters . . . " Hamilton's arguments persuaded Washington because they "maintained a tone of reasonableness
and moderation--which did not accord with his own temperament and
philosophy . . . " Thus Jefferson came to realize that it would take
more than constitutional arguments to combat Hamilton.

Malone failed

to detect anything less than complete honesty in Jefferson's countenance of Freneau's violent editorial attacks against Hamilton:
"Jefferson's cordial approval of many of these editorials and corrnnunications may be assumed."

In describing the actual rancor of the

controversy, Malone came very close to giving personality the dominant
role.

Only his extreme Jeffersonian partiality prevented the ultimate

extension of his argument.

During the first two years of Washington's

administration Hamilton "was impressed with the great patience he had
shown toward Jefferson.

" Yet there were charges rampant in the

16

National Gazette which, said h1alone, caused Hamilton to personalize
the dispute.

i1a.1one found Hamilton's entire condenmation of Jefferson

"a tissue of errors and misconceptions." His grounds were "personal
and narrowly political." Malone claimed that Hamilton may have been
annoyed "because of the difficulty of getting at [Jefferson] and
grappling with him." Hence Hamilton's reasons for direct personal
attacks lay in a sense of frustration, incited by the newspaper
criticisms. 9
D.nnas hfalone, among the pro-Jeffersonian historians, has
probably come closest to realizing the highly personal nature of the
confrontation.

He recognized that Hamilton was frustrated because

he could not get at Jefferson:

on October 24, 1792, Hamilton stated

that Jefferson had contented himself "'with defending the injured
rights of the people by obscure or indirect means. 11110 This substantiates this author's view that Hamilton indeed stepped up his personal
attacks because Jefferson would not openly engage him.

Jefferson was

able to stand by and watch Hamilton dig his political grave with his
own pen!

It is questionable whether this was a conscious act, or

simply a reflection of Jefferson's shyness.

But it is important to

note that Jefferson's diffidence was generally reflected in an aversion
to speech (he suffered from a slight lisp), and that he was in no way
9.

10.

Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Vol. n·of the
series Jefferson and His Time, by Dumas Malone (Boston: Little,
Brown, q Co., 1951), pp. 300-477.
Alexander Hamilton quoted in Dumas Malone, Jefferson arid the Rights
· of Man, Vol. II of the series Jefferson arid His•rime, by Dumas
hfalone (Boston: Little, Brown 1 &Co., 1951), p. 477.
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averse to using his own pen when properly motivated.

Nor was he above

commenting upon Hamilton's bastard origins when sufficiently stinrulated.
But :Malone omitted two very important factors in his portrait
of the confrontation.

First, he failed to justify Jefferson's hedging

to Washington concerning his actual intent in hiring Freneau.
suggests an ulterior motive on Jefferson's part.

This

Hamilton was justi-

fied in questioning Jefferson's motives in the employment of a man
whose newspaper was daily castigating him and his policies.

Second,

~1alone failed to detennine why Hamilton lost his temper at precisely
this point in the controversy and why any hope of compromise broke
down.

In J\,falone' s own language, the Bank issue had remained an

tmemotional political disagreement.

~lone confined himself strictly

to the newspaper accotmts in analyzing Hamilton's frustration.
was Washington in all of these developments?

Where

For if he supported

Hamilton's policies to the extent suggested by ~lone, why had the
Secretary of the Treasury fotmd it necessary to tmdertake his
tmilateral attack?
Certainly Jefferson himself had a direct influence on Hamilton's
considerations.

Hamilton's loss of temper was in fact latent long

before the newspaper attacks, and his violent responses were not merely
a sudden outburst.

Malone's patent Jeffersonian bias recognized but

perverted the role of personality.

If the reader is to assume that

Hamilton had some fantastic dream of establishing a monarchy with
himself at its head, then this overweening ambition alone would explain
his personal attacks.

Jefferson would then remain merely an innocent

victim who sought to avoid personal dispute while trying to save the
nation.

18
George Fort Milton, a writer of the New Deal period, revealed
prejudices similar to Malone's in extent, but on a more simplified
plane.

Jefferson's opposition to the Bank, he noted, was founded

upon two bases.

One was the oft-referred to constitutional question.

But the other was his feeling that his colleague "had taken advantage
of him in the Capital Deal." The rift was the symbolic one of who
should rule, the few or the many.
of his belief:
of Hamilton.

Milton cited Henry Adams for support

"to crush democracy by force was the ultimate resource
To crush that force was the determined intention of

Jefferson. 11 ll
This over-simplified approacl1 is reinforced in the writing of
Homer Carey Hockett, also active in the New Deal period.

In their

respective eliminations of personality, Milton and Hockett represent
the height of a purely symbolic approach to the feud.

To Hockett the

dispute was "inevitable" because of different views as to the ends
of goverrnnent.

Hamilton's measures all favored the moneyed interests,

with a view to checking the unsteadiness of the masses.
agrarian thinking opposed this view.

Jefferson's

The result of Hamilton's doctrine

of "implied powers" promoted a construction of the Constitution in
practice just what he and his associates wanted it to be.

T'nis aim

would make it easy for selfish minority groups to gain a dominant
influence in controlling national affairs.

Jefferson in turn regarded

the Constitution as akin to a corporation charter and wanted it
strictly construed.12
11.
12.

George Fort Milton, The Use of Ptesiderttial·Power (Boston: Little,
Brown, &Co., 1944), pp. 34-35.
Homer Carey Hockett; The Constitutional History of the United States
1776-1826 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939), I, 263, 265.
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It should be pointed out that Hackett's argument lacks a good
deal of credence because he was so taken up with the specious effect
of the frontier upon Jefferson's thinking.

For him Jefferson personified the "New World spirit born of the frontier. 1113 His definition

of "frontier" must be broad indeed!

Eastern Virginia in the 1790's

could hardly be considered the "frontier." Nor was Jefferson a yeoman;
his lifestyle was certainly that of the aristocrat, albeit in the
sense of the "Renaissance Man." He had spent a good deal of time in
European courts and received a William and Mary education.

Hockett

implies that Jefferson's agrarian philosophy made him a child of the
frontier.

This shaky hypothesis is equalled by his contention that

the dispute was simply "inevitable." Such a view can only claim the
dubious advantage of being able to avoid further explanations .
.Mrienne Koch carried the views of Milton and Hockett one step
further.

In a voltm1e lacking the balance present in many of the works

of the 1960's, she folllld Hamilton's differences with Jefferson a mark
of the farmer's villainy.

Hamilton did not believe in any course of

action designed to promote the popular sovereignty; instead, all of
his measures looked "to the unity and energy the system establishes."
The opposite view was held by Jefferson and Madison:

a view looking

to an extensive republic which reconciled diverging interests by
recognizing majority rights while protecting those of the minority.
i1iss Koch further asstm1ed that Hamilton could not accept the
Constitution, but rather viewed it as the only way to push for a

13.

Homer Carey Hockett, The·constitutional Histo
1776-1826 (New York:
e Macmillan Co., 939

· · · · · · ted States
5.

20

strong national goveITIIIlent.

The hope did not include on his part

any wish for a more just and liberal order. 14
Miss Koch is guilty of several errors in historical judgment.
First, she ignored the fact that most leaders accepted the Constitution largely in terms of an experiment--even Jefferson did not favor
it unless a Bill of Rights were attached.

Second, she apparently

did not recognize that differences in principle do not necessarily
reflect perverse motives on the part of Hamilton.

Political inexper-

ience prevented many leaders from seeing that the Constitution
pranoted a more liberal and just order.

IV
If the writers of the Progressive influence and of the New
Deal period reflected the desire to call in the goveITIIIlent on behalf of
the "forgotten man" and to trim the excesses begotten by following
Hamiltonian guidelines, many writers of the 1950's paid homage to
Hamilton for instituting an economy resilient enough to withstand
world war.

In addition, World War Il's version of the "return to

nonnalcy" found .Americans again turning to big business and big
money.

In the shift the goveITIIIlent left both the "comnon man" and

"big business" to reach their own equilibrium.

The Hamiltonian

partialities reflected in the historical writing of the 1950's were
less explicit than those of earlier periods and prophesied a moderation
of prior polemics.

14.

Adrienne Kod1, Madison's 'Advice to My Country' (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 84-85.
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Nevertheless some writers still did not escape the web of
symbols.

E. S. Corwin pictured the rift between Jefferson and

Hamilton as one of different views on government.

Jefferson's primary

concern was to preserve the Legislature "'pure and independent of
the Executive."' He could not permit the Constitution "'to be
warped in practice into all the principles and pollutions'" of the
Federalist conception. 15 Corwin ascribed to Hamilton the realistic
belief that the need for a strong Executive was paramount; but the
Secretary was in no way monarchical.

Prompt action, such as "well-

timed pardons," could only be accomplished by the President.

Corwin

here appears guilty of reading political statements at face value.

He

is highly illustrative of the premise that symbols often obscure more
than they enlighten. 16
Bray Hammond, for all of his financial insight and economic
competence, made the Constitution the heart of the rift.

His

admiration for Hamiltonian finance obscures most of the controversy.
Hamilton, said Hammond, desired to make the Constitution the basis
for the type of national government he believed in; Jefferson desired
to use it as a bulwark against federal encroachments.

Hamilton

wanted an "imperial future of wealth and power;" Jefferson represented
the yeomanry and wanted a future of "competence and simplicity."
Hammond's error here lies in attributing the dispute to the proposal
for a Bank of the United States.

Popular reactions against Hamilton's

15.

Thomas Jefferson quoted in E. S. Corwin, The President,:. Office and
Powers 1737.:.1957 (New York: New York University Press, !9S'7), p. 18.

16.

E. s. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957 (New York:
New York University Press, 1957), p. 18.
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policies were due, in Hammond's opinion, simply to a mistmderstanding
of his aims.

Hammond ignored the possibility that Hamil ton's own

personality alienated him from the public and that peoples' interpretations of his policies were based not only upon ignorance, but also
upon their aversion to Hamil ton's social origins.

Hammond must

certainly have been aware that one of the ftmdamental charges levelled
against Hamilton was his alleged attempt to deliberately confuse the
public.

To merely explain the mechanics of Hamilton's policies

does not answer these charges.17
Therefore it is readily apparent that writers generally, in
the periods preceding the 1960's, have concentrated upon the Constitution, philosophical and political issues, and economic dichotomies.
Some writers, like Milton and Hockett, deal almost exclusively in
abstractions.

Others, like Malone, Bolles, and Lodge are so patently

partial as to negate any insight which they otherwise lend to the
confrontation.

Personality is absent.

When it does appear, writers

have either restricted its role (e.g. a "loss of temper"), or have not
connected it with political developments.

The rancorous nature of the

dispute remains tmexplained or becomes a mere appendage to political
and philosophical arguments.
V

Other writers of the 1950's and 1960's have achieved a more
balanced view of the controversy.
17.

Some have given personality a

Bray Hannnond; Banks arid Politics in .America from the Revolution to
the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957),
pp. 91-95, 114-143.
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greater role than was evident in most earlier writings.

John C.

Miller, author of the definitive biography of Alexander Hamilton,
has noted that at the time of assumption Hamilton did not yet regard
his colleague as an enemy.
on Hamilton's report.

The latter had not yet comnitted himself

From Miller's research it is obvious that there

were in fact grollllds for assuming that the two men could work together.
Their dispute resulted either from Jefferson's misconstruing Hamilton's
intentions (possibly through financial ignorance) or the addition
of a personal invective which made compromise of differing political
and philosophical views impossible.

Miller damns the fonner alternative:

"no one could hold high office in the federal government and be as
ignorant of the issues involved in the fllllding-assumption bill as
Jefferson professed to be." He had been in contact with Madison; he
knew the world and could not be duped by Hamilton.

After all it was

Jefferson and Madison who set the price of the capital transfer.
~tiller also finds Jefferson active in manipulating public
opinion.

Jefferson used the charge of monarchism to "lllldennine

Hamilton's position before the colllltry and • . • to obscure the real
issues between himself and the Secretary of the Treasury." This
charge of monarchism was the most serious that could be levelled
against a public official in 1791-92.

It was a tremendous propaganda

weapon and Jefferson "wielded it with consurrnnate skill."

In fact

Jefferson, says Miller, wanted to believe that this charge was true.
The implication here is that Jefferson became the victim of his own
propaganda.

Evidence presented later in this work suggests that this

indeed was the case and that this rationale added one more ingredient
to the llllilegotiable nature of the feuq.
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Hence Miller finds the controversy between Jefferson and
Hamilton existing in a combination of personality and politics.

As

Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton was as deeply involved in politics
as in finance.

He exerted an influence on Congress through his

reports; in fact Congress often received more than it had bargained
for.

Republicans felt that "honest members of Congress were fatigued,

confounded, and bewildered" and were "transfonned into resistless
dupes." Jefferson found the result "a legislature legislating for
their own interests in opposition to those of the people." Hamilton's
response to Jefferson "revealed a sensitivity to sue,.11 abuse that
seriously handicapped his career in .American politics." ~tiller here
possesses the insight of Malone without the latter's flagrant bias.
Miller places "personal rancor" at the center of the dispute.

Hamilton

believed that Jefferson "nursed an insatiable ambition to dominate
the government" and wanted to install himself as Secretary of the
Treasury.

While Hamilton vented his anger in Federalist newspapers

in August of 1792, Jefferson remained silent and let others speak for
him.

This act helped further the public impression that Jefferson

was the quiet philosopher, a wise and good guardian of the public
interest.

So Hamilton fought his colleague with the intent to drive

his adversary from the Cabinet. 18
John Miller best describes the role of personality in the
dispute.

Yet even he leaves the connection between personality and

politics implicit.

18.

Miller does not relate Jefferson's belief that

John C. lliller, Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation
(New York: Harper &Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 236-250, 316-350.
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Hamilton really was a monarchist; the inability of Hamilton to draw
Jefferson out; and the catalytic agent(s) involved in Hamilton's final
loss of temper.

Miller does not clearly explain the snowball effect

of the dispute; but he does considerable justice to the role of
personality in a balanced context.
Following another avenue of approach, Nathan Schachner has
arrived at a more enlightening balance.

His central thesis is the

proposition that "no two men could have been more diametrically
opposed in every respect." Jefferson was the more universal man;
Hamilton confined his talent to economics and government.

The "Report

on Public Credit" bustled with facts, figures, and arguments which
were "perhaps too rich in intricate calculations that served only to
bewilder the reader." With respect to assumption, Hamilton was
convinced of its necessity while the site of the capital was only
important "insofar as it catered to local vanity and local profit."
Here Schachner lends credence to this author's contention that
Hamilton's own social origins tied him solely to the national government and rendered him devoid of any local pride.

J~fferson, before

assumption, remained aloof "from partisan passions and Congressional
wrangling," allowing Virginia Congressmen to propose the capital
exchange.

Again Schachner substantiates this writer's position that

Jefferson's ''Virginia code of the gentleman," like Washington's, caused
him to insulate himself from partisan wrangling.

Hamilton, on the

other hand, was a man in the process of ''becoming," having to
literally make his own reputation.
essence of his self-assertion.

Political victories were the
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Schachner expresses the complexity of Hamilton's policy in
postulating that it threatened "at times to topple of its own weight."
This fact aided in charges of corruption since his policies often
appeared as deliberate attempts to bewilder and confuse.

Attacks

engineered in the National Gazette castigated Hamilton for this
purported deceit, and in that fonn the dispute reached the entire
country.

Washington, meanwhile, felt that Hamilton and Jefferson

''balanced each other." Schachner views Jefferson's reply to Washington's
for restraint as too personal.

In his letter Jefferson stated that

"I will not suffer my retirement to be clouded by the slanders of a
man whose history . . . is a tissue of machinations against the liberty
of the country . . . 1119
Schachner's allusion to Jefferson's personal response gives
a new twist to the historiography of the controversy.
element had been solely ascribed to Hamilton.
leaves much implicit.

Previously that

However, Schachner too

He does not precisely relate personality and

politics, nor does he make clear the explicit role of personality in
the causal chain leading to verbal assault in the split. 20
Schachner's idea of Jefferson's aloofness from partisan dispute
receives a mild contradiction from the late Douglas Southall Freeman.
In the matter of assumption the Secretary of State "saw no reason why
he should not use his influence with members of Congress . . . "
Washington alone remained truly aloof, and in the assumption argument

19.

Thomas Jefferson quoted in Nathan Schachneri The Fouriding·Fathers
(New York: Capricorn Books, 1954), pp. 220, 221.

20.

Nathan Schachner, The Founding Fathers (New York:
1954), pp. 62, 89, 113-120, 218-223.

Capricorn Books,
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''nobody could quote a word Washington had spoken or written on
assumption." While he was attacked as the tool of Hamilton, Freeman
pointed out that Washington did not always side with him.

The

President ignored Hamilton's advice and agreed with Jefferson in
vetoing a new reapportionment bill because he felt it unworkable
since it did not apply the same fixed population ratio to each state.
Freeman made clear that any assertion that Washington was completely
under Hamilton's influence is difficult to substantiate.

It would

appear instead that he "sided" with various Cabinet members on the
basis of his own reasoning.
On

the larger nature of the feud Freeman asserted that Hamilton

held power in govennnent through funding, assumption, and the Bank,
but in the contest with Jefferson he "carelessly remained on the
defensive." Washington all the while stood for compromise, but felt
after the exchange of letters in late 1792 that there existed a
"deep personal animosity between the two men." Unfortunately Freeman
left the personal issue on this note.

However, he cannot be exces-

sively criticized for this omission since his subject focus is upon
Washington.

To Washington, Freeman maintains, the absolute cooperation

of the two Secretaries was to the nation's good.

He "wanted Hamilton

and Jefferson together in his Cabinet as long as he possibly could
hold them," despite the fact that the ideal of one was the abomination
of tl1e other.

The President was confident that both men would

compromise, "but that faith found little • . . to substantiate it."
Freeman here implied that Washington suffered from an illusion.21
21.

It

Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington:· a Biography (New York:
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is exactly within this sphere that Washington perfonned the role of
unwitting catalyst.
The interaction between members of the Jefferson-HamiltonWashington trilUilVerate is described in detail by William Nisbet
Chambers.

Hamilton's chief aim of govennnent was to bind the wealthy

to the nation through self-interest--not corruption.

Some of Hamilton's

hopes were realized by Washington's very presence, for the latter
possessed a "corrnnanding prestige." The President encouraged a
rational, legal basis for authority based on the Constitution.

He

played a great role in the transition of this conception to reality.
Jefferson, in tum, became a contemporary symbol for the opposition
to Hamilton's doctrines via his personal appeal, his writings on
democracy, and his liberal reforms in Virginia.

He came to be viewed

as something of "the detached -intellectual in politics."

22

Unfor-

tunately Chambers' description of the dispute deals little with
personality.

It does achieve a fundamental balance.

The nature of

Chambers' subject, the founding of political parties and the forces
surrounding them, precludes any extensive discussion of the division
between the two Cabinet members.
VI
Despite a general lack of emphasis on personality, there are
many conclusions concerning the dispute to be derived from the
historiography of the controversy.
22.

First, there is present virtually

William Nisbet Chambers, Political Patties in a New Nation.(New
York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 35-59.
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a "wave pattern" of historical bias in favor of one or the other
disputants.

Second, even those writers who deal with personality do

so inadequately.

Third, patent partiality often reveals more polemics

than enlightenment.

Fourth, those recent writers who do strike a

more balanced view usually do so when writing on a subject other than
one of the two men (Miller is the exception here).
Perhaps the single best explanation for diversity of interpretation lies in the authors' climates of opinion.

At about the tum of

the twentieth century Hamilton was very popular in an era of capitalist
expansion and industrial development.
in this period.

Bolles, Bassett, and Lodge wrote

Writers of the enduring Progressive influence of the

1920's reacted against the excessive ties between business and government.

Such discontent both echoed the earlier Progressive Era and

prophesied the New Deal writings.

The New Deal period extended

critical attitudes toward Hamilton in a period when the government
sought to redress the balance between business and the common man.
The 1950's found a rebirth of Hamiltonian favor which coincided with
a change in government attitude based upon the vindication of the
.American system in World War II.

The government again participated

in the economy, but on a limited scale minus the radical stigma
attached to the New Deal.

Indeed, interpretations are not purely

conditioned by these economic and political climates, but the trends
toward bias correlate remarkably with climates of opinion.
But the greater purpose of this chapter has been not only to
sunnnarize what major historians have said concerning the dispute, but
to identify their omissions: · ·several authors have been too preoccupied
with symbols.

As such the two men have been divested of their human
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qualities and allowed to assume the roles of evil and good incarnate,
the personification of aristocracy and democracy.

Since personality

is the most "human" of man's traits, discussions dealing solely with
the symbolic and the abstract remove this human factor from the
equation.
This discussion indicates the necessity for more than a synthesis.

Even with the exhaustion of a fixed amount of primary source

material, much has been left unsaid.

The role of personality must be

made explicit, replete with answers to the questions of why the
dispute became devoid of compromise, of Washington's role in the
confrontation, and of the significance for the historian in all of
these factors.

It remains to return the human element to its rightful

role in the dispute and to reduce the abstract to a more realistic
proportion.

Personality is the key to an objective and balanced

discussion of the Jefferson-Hamilton-Washington triumverate.

CHAPTER TWO
TWO STATES OF MIND .AND .AN EARLY COMPROMISE

I

The "unique traits" fanning the distinct personalities of
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson go far in explaining both
men's approach to govenunent.

Personality factors, taken together

with specific policies and philosophies, worked concomitantly to
create the Cabinet rift.

Despite the widely diverse interpretations

of the dispute by .American historians, there is a remarkable "consensus"
of personality traits among these same authors.
Hamilton's personality was penneated by forceful ambition,
undying arrogance and vanity, a supreme ego, a frustrated existence,
a logical intellect capable of overnmning itself with intolerant
invective, and a high degree of sensitivity, especially to criticism
of his ideas or policies.

He was marked by a craving for stature

and influence, a desire to compensate for his lowly birth and his
late arrival upon the .American scene, and a natural vanity deriving
from a superior intellect.

Above all, opposition spawned both

intolerance and a desire to overwhelm it on the part of the Secretary
of the Treasury.
Jefferson's personality traits stand at a pole opposite that
of Hamilton's.

His make-up was penneated by mental acuteness, quick

wit, shrewd imagination, profound sagacity, all in the face of a
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distinct shyness.

Unlike Hamilton he was tactful and quite captivating.

Also unlike Hamilton he understood his fellow man.

He never sought to

overawe or to over-shadow, and his chief attribute was cunning; he
abhorred the frontal attack.

In short, he preferred to work behind

the scenes and to avoid public confrontation; Hamilton's own craving
for a stature that Jefferson already possessed led him to demand the
public spotlight and to desire public combat.
Many of these differences of personality emanated from the
backgrounds of the two men.

Thomas Jefferson's birth and later

education molded him into the "Renaissance Man." As Jefferson once
stated, "There is not a sprig of grass that grows uninteresting to
me. 111 There had been Jeffersons in Virginia from the earliest times
of colonial .America.
Virginia land in 1735.

His father had patented 1000 acres of Tidewater
The pioneering and exploration accomplished

by his ancestors produced an intense pride on the part of Jefferson.
Jefferson received a classical education, beginning at age
nine.

He was already a member of a family of status since his father

had become wealthy in land and slaves by the time of his death in
1757.

When it came time for his college experience, Jefferson

chose William and Mary in Williamsburg.

At this time Williamsburg

was the provincial capital of Albemarle County and the rultural seat
of much of Virginia.

For two years the young aristocrat lived and

studied in this cosmopolitan environment.

He was influenced greatly

by Dr. William Small of Scotland, a man "with a happy talent of

1.

Thomas Jefferson quoted in Thomas Fleming, The Man from Monticello
(New York: William ~Iorrow &Co., Inc., 1969), p. 3.
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connnunication, correct and gentlemanly manners, and an enlarged and
liberal mind."

Dr. Small instructed Jefferson in mathematics, natural

philosophy, natural history, logic, ethics, rhetoric, and belles
lettres.

At the same time, Jefferson had much contact with the

Royal Governor, Francis Fauquier, who "introduced him to the life of
mltivated manners, taste, and sensibility."

From this came Jefferson's

sense of the "code of the Virginia gentleman. 112
This "code" was a dominant part of Jefferson's larger personality.

The "Virginia Code of the gentleman" was an "unwritten code

of political behavior" in Virginia in which the masses looked for
leadership to the

11

rich, the well-born, and the able."

In Virginia

this leadership was comprised of the planter aristocracy.

Prereq-

uisites for membership in this body in the 1790's included prominent
family background, land, and the qualities befitting Mgeritlenien of
character." These were understood to be a sense of noblesse oblige
which caused the aristocracy to recognize their responsibilities to
their yeoman brethren; an abhorrence of public dispute; damnation of
political in-fighting and electioneering techniques.

The "Code"

reflected all of the courtesies and amenities of its beneficiaries. 3
The "Code 11 actuated Jefferson's courtesy--a caller at Monticello
could always expect a gracious and soft-voiced greeting.

The aristo-

crat loved music and his violin was his "most precious possession."
He was also an incurable romantic, as reflected in his courtship with

2.

Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-28.

3.

Charles S. Sydnor, Gentlemen Freeholders (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 2, 3, 6, 10, 60-61, 63-64.
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and marriage to Martha Jefferson·.· · At· her deathbed Jefferson fainted
and could not be revived for over an hour.
Jefferson's romantic tum of mind.

Monticello itself revealed

Its designer and master studied the

ruins of Rome and learned much of Classical architecture from Andrea
Palladio.

His love of gardening caused him to surround his entire

estate with a series of beautiful gardens:

"His romantic state of

mind obviously had something to do with this preference."

Indeed

the chief appeal of the name ''Monticello" was "its sweetly romantic
ring. 114 Jefferson's romanticism, his social rearing, his education,
and his own intellect made him a man of wide and varied interests.
He studied and wrote on education, logic, ethics and religion,
agriculture, science, govenunent, and the nature of man himself.
It is then no surprise that he was the idol of so many and the
literary spokesman for a nation largely composed of agrarian interests.
Alexander Hamilton's birth and social milieu produced a much
different effect upon his personality.

In a letter written in 1769

to a friend Hamilton stated "my youth excludes me from any hopes of
innnediate preferment. . . but I mean to prepare the way for futurity."
At this time Hamilton was only fourteen and an inhabitant of the
Danish island of Saint Croix in the West Indies.

In this same letter

Hamilton expressed the dominant factor of his personality:

"My

ambition is prevalent . . . 115 The path leading to the realization of
such ambition was one filled with many barriers~ most prominent of

4.

Fleming, 2E.· cit., pp. 3-15.
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Alexander Hamilton quoted in Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1970), p. 1.
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which was his birth.

Hamilton was quite literally a "love child."

His father was a young trader, and his mother an unhappily married
woman who left her husband to live with James Hamilton in 1752.
1755 Alexander was born of this bond.

In

Following his birth, Hamilton's

father was never able to make his way financially, shifting to various
West Indian firms.

Nevertheless Alexander attended Kings College

(Columbia) where he was a "fervid" student.

At the time of the

.American Revolution the outlet for compensatory behavior shifted
from the classroom to the battlefield.

In 1776 he received a military

corrnnand which was to prepare him for his later government ''connnand''
after 1789.6 At Yorktown Hamilton "characteristically proceeded to
risk his life for glory." He ordered his troops, who were under heavy
British fire, to roll the dTillllS and go through the manual of arms.

The

"dumbfounded" British gunners held their fire while the .Americans
performed their extraordinary drill! 7 His personality was reflected
in all that he sought, for Hamilton had no status save that gained
from policies and achievements bearing his name.

He shifted from the

ambitious boy of fourteen, to the college student seeking achievement,
to the soldier seeking glory, and finally to the Cabinet member
seeking influence.

But Hamilton was a sincere patriot.

sought to totally exclude the masses from government.

He never
He proclaimed

that were the body politic to "give all the power to the few, they will

6.

Mitchell, op cit, pp. 1-6.

7.

John C. Miller~ Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation
(New York: Harper &Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 77.
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oppress the many. 118 Though leaving the Constitutional Convention in
disgust because he feared that it was becoming a body dedicated to
the exclusion of a strong central goveTillilent, he was willing to be
its first Secretary of the Treasury and to make the Constitution work-toward his own goal of a strong central govenunent.

His patriotism

and desire for political influence were inseparable.
The differences in personality present in the two men were
perhaps best reflected in their models of govenunent.
pt1ssessed

a scrong preaYiection :tor tnings British.

Hamilton
The political

purpose of his economic policy was to draw the wealthy classes to his
cause.

His knowledge of English history told him that since the days

of Walpole the wealthy had exercised a political influence beyond their
numbers.

The way to tie .America together was via a strong fiscal

program.

He marvelled at the strength of British credit in the

contemporary world and eagerly adopted the British system of William
Pitt.

Great Britain had never defaulted in a payment since the creation

of the Bank of England.

In fact, Hamilton followed the English

model "as far as he could. 119 His English middle class theory told
him that national welfare could be promoted by the bonds of selfinterest.

The "betters" would control the national destiny.

If he

were the promulgator of this bond, then his own influence would be
paramotmt.

Again patriotism and political influence became one.

If

8.

Alexander Hamilton quoted in Homer Carey Hockett, The Constitutional
History of the United States, 1777~1826 (New York: nie Macmillan
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such a view left little room for the masses, it was by conscious
design.

For Hamilton had said that the people were "turbulent and

changing; they seldom judge or detennine right. 1110 This statement
was thoroughly in keeping with his own desire for status and the
desire to rise above his ignominious birth.
Thomas Jefferson's predilection for things French was also
in keeping with his own varied and romantic personality.

His affection

had been garnered before his visit to France as .American .Ambassador,
and was tied in with his philosophical and literary interests.

He

gave his full support to the "liberal philosophers, scientists, and
economists . . . " of the Enlightenment.

From his own sense of

noblesse oblige he became a "tolerant and somewhat patronizing teacher
of the French . . . " After five years in France, Jefferson came home
believing that the .American scene was to be the realization of the
liberties promised by the .American Revolution.

In turn, he felt

that the French Revolution to 1790 was a model of its .American
predecessor.

He also felt that the British planned "economic slavery"

for the United States.

Hence he chose close ties with the French as

a counterbalance.
But far more important, with respect to personality, was the
suggestion that at least part of his own Francophilia "was inspired.
by an understandable jealousy of his adversary's brilliance." Here
was a personal response to Hamilton's dominating role in the Cabinet!
Here also was an excellent example of the connection between personality
and politics.

10.

Jefferson's personal disdain for the cold, calculating,

Alexander Hamilton quoted in Hockett,

op

cit, p. 261.
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and pragmatic Hamilton was also in part born of the fact that he had
held the American republic in "so pure an image during his years
abroad. 1111
It was with these personality traits, predilections, and

preconceptions that Hamilton and Jefferson entered the confrontation
which broke the hannony of Washington's first Cabinet.

These factors

are present in varying degrees in virtually every facet of the rift;
the personal and the political worked concomitantly to condition the
dispute; but only the personal denied the possibility of compromise.
II

If personality was the catalyst to excessive vehemence in the
dispute, it was not apparent in the early relationship between the
two men.

Yet, many of.the.personality traits noted above were in fact

present even in these early meetings.

But in the interplay of issues

and personality, the fonner overshadowed the latter.

The issues of

assumption and Hamilton's proposal for a Bank of the United States
fully illustrate these premises, and also reveal that something other
than political and philosophical disagreement was needed to cause an
open breach between the two men.
III

Hamilton's ambition, tendency to overawe, and his fervid tenacity
are all revealed in his explanation of the theory behind fllllding and

11.

Lawrence S. Kaplan, Jefferson and France (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1967), pp. viii, 37-40.
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assumption as found in his first "Report on the Public Credit." The
theme of the report was the belief that "the credit of a nation should
be well established." Assumption was designed to "be a measure of
sound policy and substantial justice." Although the report consistently revealed Hamilton's desire to tie the wealthy to the goveITIIIlent,
it also reflected his own personality.

For the entire "Report" created

a malaise of complexity and a deluge of figures and arguments.

He

desired to gain support for the measure through overwhelming evidence
and calculated logic.

Hamilton did not desire to delude his readers

by his figures but rather to overwhelm them and hence gain their
support.

His reasoning was something akin to the layman taking the

word of his physician because the nature of the latter's terminology
must mean that he knows what he is talking about.
His reliance on the British model was a dominant factor in
his funding proposal.

Hamilton constantly brought his reader's

attention to bear on the benefits of a funded debt as revealed by the
British experience.

At the same time he admitted that the funding

process would take time.

Here he was simply out of step with the

view shared by many, including Jefferson, that contemporary leadership did not have the right to bind future generations either
politically or economically.
Perhaps the most valid basis for charges of Hamil ton's contempt
for the average man lay in his answer to Madison's "discrimination
proposals." Madison proposed to recompense the original holders of
the debt who had sold their certificates, paying them the difference
between the face value of the certificates and the market value.
Current holders would receive the market price.

Hamilton's original
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plan had called for the full face value payment to the current holders.
He answered :Madison's proposal by calling it a breach of contract and
a violation of the rights of fair purchase.
destroy the buyer's faith.

Discrimination would

While the Secretary did not deny that many

original holders were forced to sell their certificates out of
necessity, he maintained that:
They have not only nothing to object to the persons who
relieved their necessities . . . but they are even under an
implied condition to contribute to the reimbursement of those
persons. 12
Such beliefs were logical, systematic, and highly impersonal.

But they

were in no way designed to appeal to the soldier who did in fact have
to give up his certificates in order to support himself.

This

reasoning plus the detail and expertise of Hamilton's specific
proposals in the assumption measure promoted public misunderstanding
of Hamilton's provisions, skepticism of his motives, and damnation
of his British "tone." One response asserted that the British creditor
would then receive

"110,000 instead of the 12500."

It also posited

that the whole report was "so flimsy, and so full of absurdities,
contradictions and impracticalities, that it is to be hoped it will
be voted out of Congress without a dissenting voice. 1113
Such a response was obviously oversimplified.

Hamilton did

not desire to benefit foreigners and his cut to three per cent in
12.

Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative to a Provision for the Support
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interest was made because the U.S. could not afford to pay the full
six per cent.

This reduction of interest on one-third of the bonds

representing the principal of the debt meant in effect that the debt
had been "artificially decreased." But the Secretary did not answer
the charges concerning the "distressed family," "sick soldier," and
other oppressed original holders.
with the corrmon man.

His arrogance precluded discussion

Vicarious status by means of the wealthy could

only be attained by championing their cause, and this meant giving
total support to the current holders of certificates.

Influence

with the connnon man was reserved to the landed aristocrat, Thomas
Jefferson, who could afford to cater to the democratic tastes of the
public since he already had their respect.
Because of Hamilton's blatant indifference to the public
response and because of sectional hostility to his program of assumption,
the measure failed to pass the House.

Jefferson's account of the

resulting compromise agreement reveals much concerning both the
influence of personality and the fact that at this point the two men
were capable of cooperation.

Jefferson was approached by a Hamilton

who appeared "sombre, haggard, and dejected beyond description."

It

is little wonder since Hamilton's influence would suffer much damage
if assumption were to fail.

This is a highly important factor since

Hamilton identified the promotion of national welfare with the acceptance
of his own policies.

He explained to Jefferson that the rejection of

the measure would cause the New England states to regard this as "a

sine qua :rion of a continuance of the Union." Jefferson reported
Hamil ton as urging a '' corrmon cause in supporting one another.''
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Jefferson's position is also revealing.

Two years after the

bargain he used his long absence from the country to explain that he
"had lost a familiarity with its affairs," while admitting that
assumption had first hit him in "an unfavorable light." Nevertheless
he had invited Hamilton and Madison to dine as a "first step toward
some conciliation of views." Since the pill would ''be a bitter one
to the Southern states," the transfer of the capital to a Southern
location was urged.

Jefferson claimed that he was not sure who had

proposed this--"I forget by which of them." Considering the small
number of those present, it is highly unlikely that Jefferson would
not remember something as significant as the proposal to exchange
the site of the capital for the passage of the assumption measure.
This statement strongly suggests that Jefferson was already, in 1792,
at least subconsciously trying to suppress any part of his own in
that compromise measure.

This suppression marked the initiation of

Jefferson's complex rationale which became fully developed in the
course of the dispute.

That rationale was to explain how Jefferson

had altruistically worked with Hamilton at first, before discovering
his true intent.
Already in 1792 Jefferson's rationale had begun to take shape.
He claimed that he had considered assumption basically "unjust" from
the beginning.

It "was acquiesced in merely from a fear of disunion."

To this idealistic explanation he juxtaposed the supposed deceit of
Hamilton.

Assumption provided "a principal grolllld whereon was reared

up that speculating phalanx." Through hindsight Jefferson attempted to
explain away his part in an agreement now perceived as a "corrupt
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bargain. 1114 Continuing rationalization of his action developed into
what might be described as a paranoia manifested in the total danmation
of everything Hamiltonian.
But the seed of rationale was planted in 1792 by Jefferson, not
in 1790 at the time of the assumption crisis itself.

In June of 1790

Jefferson had clearly seen the need for "nrutual" sacrifices concerning
assumption.

Jefferson here made no mention of Hamilton's alleged

deception and did not even impute to him the suggestion to transfer the
site of the capitai. 15 Personality was submerged beneath financial,
sectional, and legislative considerations.

The issue reveals that

Hamilton and Jefferson could and did work together in resolving an
issue possessed of the potential for a sectional explosion.

Yet person-

ality was itself a factor in the fonnulation of and reaction to
assumption.

IV
Hamilton's tendency to overwhelm was perhaps best revealed in
his explanation of the First Bank of the United States.

This issue

precipitated the total breakdown of agreement between Jefferson and
his colleague.

But despite the lack of compromise the dispute was

still impersonal.

Hamilton's logical and calculated arguments

reflected his need to place his stamp upon the very conception of
goveTI1Jilent.

Hamilton's own arrogance plus his need to achieve status

14.
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through the success of his policies caused him to equate efficiency of
government with those policies, a curious mixture of patriotism and
vanity.

The stamp became identified as the "doctrine of implied

powers," which stated that:
every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign,
and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the
means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of
the ends of such power; and which are not precluded by
restrictions and exceptions specified in the constitution; or
not innnoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political
society. 10
In addition Hamilton boldly stated that any who would deny this doctrine
must "prove a distinction." The implied powers were to be "as effectually delegated" as "expressed" powers.

The power of erecting a

corporation may be employed as a ''means" of executing a specific
power or end of government.

Therefore the Bank was constitutional,

for it was a means of carrying out the expressed powers of the
collection of taxes, and supervision of foreign and domestic trade.
The obviously intricate logic of his arguments, their bold assertion,
and the refusal to recognize any opposing argument emphasize Hamilton's
identification of national welfare with acceptance of his policy.
Patriotism, politics, and personality all merged in the doctrine of
implied powers.
Also dominant was Hamilton's fetish for things British.

He

frankly acknowledged the British model for the Bank, ''whence our
notions of it are inmediately borrowed."

It is important to note

here that Hamilton's acknowledgement was a direct one.
16.
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for the British was never hidden and was apparently so strong that he
could not restrain mention of his gratitude.

Even more important is

the suggestion that the Secretary could not willingly "dupe" his
audience, for his own personality made him so direct as to preclude
deception.

Hence he explicitly acknowledged the English model; he

directly condemned opposing opinions; and he directly stated that
implied powers were equally sovereign with expressed powers.

At the

same time Hamilton felt himself the only man capable of transferring
the best of what was British to the American scene, an inauspicious
pres1.IDiption in the face of an anti-British agrarian .America.
In the same vein Hamilton refuted Jefferson.

The latter had

stated that the Bank would give "great facility or convenience in the
collection of taxes . . . ," but that this function alone did not
render the institution either "necessary" or "proper. 1117 Hamilton
denied Jefferson's conception of strict construction by asserting that
any power must be uniform and invariable.

It could not depend upon

"casual and temporary circumstances" as Jefferson had stated, and to
Hamilton this alone refuted constriction of powers:

"Necessary often

means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to." That Jefferson would give the word a restricted definition
was "an idea never before entertained. 1118 Here Hamilton expressed a
hint of contempt toward Jefferson; the latter's opinion was described
in language resembling a veiled charge of heresy.

The Secretary could

17.
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neither tolerate opposition, nor refrain from verbally annihilating
it.

His attacks on Jefferson were still impersonal, but his own

unique personality traits were evident in the language.
Jefferson's argLU!lents against the Bank made clear his views
on goveTilJilent and did not reveal any of the later critical rationalization of Hamilton's motives.

To go beyond the entnnerated powers was

"to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible
of definition." The "facility or convenience" in the collection of
taxes was not enough to warrant the charter of a Bank, and Hamilton's
construction of the Constitution would break down "the most ancient
and fundamental laws of the several States . • . for a shade or two of
convenience . . . "

But for all of his fear of a monopoln dedication

to states' rights, and the concern that the legislature was being
misled, Jefferson did not impugn Hamilton's motives.

The closest he

came to a personal danmation of Hamilton was his statement that the
President must use his power of veto when the legislature was "misled
by error, ambition, or interest." Jefferson implied here his later
assertion of a "corrupt squadron" in Congress benefitting from
Hamilton's policies, but at this stage the idea was still in an
unformed state.19
In an examination of the argLU!lents of both men concerning the
Bank, more than a political picture of respective philosophies of
goveTilJilent arises.

Hamilton's argLU!lents reveal his sense of the

"nation-builder." His own self-imagery was inextricably involved in
the affairs of the new nation.
19.
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have bolstered his own ego, but according to his own belief, the
national welfare would be correspondingly increased.
and the Bank reflect this view.

Both assumption

His own statements are the best

evidence for suggesting such a thesis.

Hamilton's financial proposals

were all-encompassing and involved a large-scale consolidation of
financial affairs under the aegis of the government.
establishment of a far reaching precedent.

He was seeking

Hamilton was no public

politician, for his own origins and his intellect prevented this;
nor did he possess the charisma of a Washington whose very signature
on a document gave it high public prestige.

Only acceptance of his

policies could give Hamilton that prestige; his charisma had to be a
vicarious entity achieved by the recognition that his name was upon
the precedents of the new government.

It was this view that Thomas

Jefferson came to fear.
But in the assumption measure there was a basis for compromise
based upon national interest.

The capital transfer did not violate

Hamilton's consistency, for it was a fundamental tenet of his program
to establish American credit.

The transfer also suggests that

Hamilton saw his destiny with the national government, and was willing
to sacrifice any local ties to New York to the national end.

In

achieving his measure Hamilton did not have to compromise anything.
But to Jefferso11- assUIJIP,tion .wc!-5 indeed a compromise.
the bill favorea·the North in economic tenns.

By definition

Jefferson's acceptance

of the capital transfer solution may be ascribed to his genuine
nationalism and fear of disunion.
Hamilton of duplicity.

But in 1790 he did not accuse

Even more ·:important the Bank dispute, while

reflecting strongly the personality traits of both men, did not
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become a personal issue.
With the advent of the "newspaper war" political, economic,
and philosophical differences all bowed before personality.

Vitupera-

tion, verbal assault, and a malaise of charges and counter-charges
marked the controversy from this point on.

This "newspaper war" was a

vital factor in the causal chain explaining the violence of the dispute.

CHAPTER IBREE
IBE ''NEWSPAPER WAR:"

l\ORE TI-IAN JUST BATTLES

The "newspaper war" deserves extended connnent, for it was the
battleground upon which Hamilton brought his verbal attack to the
dispute and upon which Jefferson engaged in deceit.

In February 1791

Thomas Jefferson invited Philip Freneau, the "Poet of the Revolution,"
to become a Translating Clerk in the State Department.

Freneau was

distinctly anti-monarchical and anti-British, and enjoyed a national
reputation as a champion of the people largely through his Federal
Gazette.

His salary in the State Department was to be only $250 a

year, necessitating his employment in some other capacity.

Jefferson's

original offer for the position included the statement that he would
be free to pursue "any other calling. 111 This leads to the proposition
that Jefferson was not opposed to Freneau's establishing a newspaper,
especially since the latter's Federal Gazette was so well known.
Madison mea:f1:while made great efforts to get Freneau to set up a newspaper in the nation's capital. 2 To sunnise Jefferson to be truly
ignorant of all of these circumstances strains credibility.

In a

newspaper established in the capital came the opportunity for Jefferson
and Madison to parry the thrusts offered by Fenno's Gazette of the
United States.
1.
2.

Jefferson to Freneau, February 28, 1791, in Mary S. Austin, Philip
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As

a result of :Madison's promptings and Freneau' s own

predilections, the National Gazette appeared in October of 1791.
The newspaper's establishment was a key event in the course of the
dispute, for Freneau was probably the "most biting critic of public
men and policies then existing in the United States." He was a
master of satire and invective, both in his poetry and in his prose,
and he loved to roast the Anglo-phile, Alexander Hamilton.

From his

own firsthand experience on an English prison ship, Freneau harbored
a hatred for the British which far transcended political opposition.
When, in Freneau's mind, Hamilton's policies began to clearly indicate
a tendency toward establishment of British ideals in .America, the
time for attack was nigh.

On

May 3, 1792 the rapacious Freneau

wrote:
Public exigencies pressingPublic debt's a public blessing!
But secure, there nothing worse is:
Public debts are public curses!
Public debts are public curses
In soldiers' hands! there nothing worse is!
In speculators' hands increasing
Public debt's a public blessing!~
The sense of the stanzas expressed a growing concern with the
connotations of Hamilton's financial policies.

By July, 1792 Hamilton

was ready to reply.
It was Hamilton's replies that marked the entry of personal
denigration into the dispute.

When the dispute became dominated by

personal response, al_l hope of compromise was lost.

3.
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appeared in John Fenno's Federalist newspaper, the Gazette of the
United States, signed "T. L.," charging that Freneau was given
government employment so as to better abuse the administration:

"In

common life it is thought ungrateful for a man to bite the hand that
puts bread in his mouth; but if the man is hired to do it, the case
is altered. ii4 This letter of July 25 was clearly from the pen of
.Alexander Hamilton.

On July 28 Hamilton became even more maledictory,

claiming that Freneau's paper was always "Free to defame, but never
free to praise. 115 To this point, however, Hamilton had not named
Jefferson as an accomplice of Freneau although the veil was indeed
thin.

Freneau' s reply destroyed any pretenses on the part of Hamilton.

The editor called Hamilton, "a vile sycophant" who found "his interest
in attempting to poison the minds of the people by propagating and
disseminating principles and sentiments utterly subversive of the
true republican interests of this country. . . 6
11

Before exploring Hamilton's diatribes, published under the
pseudonym of "An American," it is necessary to explain why Hamilton
felt forced to enter the dispute so openly.

Attacks in Freneau's

paper had been carried on since March of 1792 when the editor had
charged that funding was a coercive measure to gain votes.

On

April 5 Freneau charged that Hamilton's policies expressed "Principles
subversive to the equal rights of man . . . " He included a warning to
4.
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Hamilton:

"Let the Secretary of Treasury and his adherents beware.

At first Hamilton relied on the Federalist editor, John Fenno,
to refute Freneau.

Fenno's paper possessed the largest cirrulation of

any U.S. newspaper and was habitually wont to extol the virtues of
Alexander Hamilton and to decry the levelling tendencies of Thomas
Jefferson.

But Fenno's replies were far from sufficient.

He even

succeeded in trapping himself by calling Hamilton's abusers "persons
from other countries who have lately escaped from bondage" and who knew
"not how to enjoy liberty. 118 Freneau retorted that Fenno was slandering
the many Irishmen, Scotch, Frenchmen, and Gennans in Philadelphia:
"He swears (and who dares disbelieve him when he swears?) that you
foreigners are a set of rebellious turbulent dogs. 119 Since the "semiofficial national Federalist organ" had failed to overturn Freneau,
Hamilton felt obliged to enter the controversy personally.IO
Thus on August 4, 1792, when Hamilton entered the affray as
".An .American," the "newspaper war" became a matter of personalities.

Under the thinly veiled pseudonym, Hamilton called the National
Gazette "a newspaper instituted by a public officer, and the Editor
of it regularly pensioned with the public money, in the disposal of
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that officer."

Freneau became "the faithful and devoted servant of the
head of a party, from whose hand he receives the boon. 1111
It must be remembered, however, that in 1792 politicians did
not have the precedents available for dividing the personal from the
political.

The focus was naturally on persons since "parties" did

not exist and any tendency toward their development was deplored.

In

1792 the concept of "party" itself was generally identified with

dissolution, and the republic itself was considered a fragile experiment.

Hence to Hamilton, Freneau's attacks harbored an element of

anarchy.

Since Hamilton identified national welfare with acceptance

of his own policies, violent opposition to them meant ignorance or
dishonesty.

This conviction, coupled with Hamilton's own sensitivity

to criticism, gave his verbal assaults a violence which negated the
hope of future cooperation.
Following Hamilton's August 4 volley, Freneau produced a sworn
affadavit that Jefferson had no role in establishing his paper; that
Jefferson had not written a single line "directly or indirectly;" and
that he ran the newspaper "free--unfettered--and uninfluenced. 1112
The document only aroused Hamilton's frustration, for with Freneau's
"proof" he saw that he would be unable to draw Jefferson into open
dispute.

His second reply as "An American," on August 11, claimed

that any statement of Jefferson's non-complicity was "a shocking
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instance of rashness and levity." He then attempted to prove
"decisively" Freneau's "improper connection with the Secretary of
" Hamilton noted that Freneau never attacked Jefferson

State.

or his colleagues; that his appointment as Translating Clerk and his
establishment of a newspaper were surprisingly coincidental; and that
Freneau' s job and salary left him remarkably "free" to edit a newspaper.

Nor did Hamilton leave any doubt toward whom his strictures

were aimed.

They had been "drawn forth principally with a view to a
character of greater importance in the comnunity. 1113
Although the precise role as causal agent of the "newspaper

war" will be described later in this work, the incident at this point
contains several important factors with respect to personality.

One

is the fact that to Hamilton the establishment of Freneau's paper
suggested deceit on the part of Jefferson.

Second, the inability

of Fermo to successfully answer Freneau's violent charges and the
inability to draw Jefferson into the affray caused Hamilton to enter
the dispute with acid pen.

Third, this entry marked the control by

personality of the dispute's course.

Fourth, concomitantly Hamilton's

entry revealed his inability to restrain his criticism, his
sensitivity to opposition, his frustration at not being able to
"get at" Jefferson, and his ineptitude at concealing even his own
identity.

Finally, "the newspaper war" ended the possibility of

compromise because it became a fonnn for such extreme language that
any retraction would cause its writer supreme discredit.

13.
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Jefferson himself had not written a line, or at least kept his
involvement so concealed that Hamilton could not prove any authorship, Hamilton was placed in the frustrating position of levelling
charges at a man who never replied in person.

As

such, Philip

Freneau's editorials became the vehicle which transported the rift
from philosophy to personality.
But if such a division in the Cabinet threatened the new
goveTI1IDent with fatal strife, why did the President not work to
silence Hamilton or Freneau?

In fact where did Washington stand in

the dispute, and why was his absence so conspicuous in the "newspaper
war?"

It was the distinct personality of George Washington which

kept him out of the controversy, and which paradoxically made him
very much a part of it.

GIAPTER FOUR
THE CENTRAL FIGURE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
An

examination of Washington's personal and political states

of mind reveals a man of noteworthy detachment.

Above all he was a

charismatic figure who maintained the respect of both Cabinet members:
"To the masses he was the maker of a nation; to the world of fashion,
he was the creator of a Court. 111
The President responded to this respect in every facet of
Executive decision-making:
In every act of my administration I have sought the
happiness of my fellow citizens. ~1y system for the
attainment of this object has unifonnly been to overlook
all personal, local, and partial considerations; to
contemplate the United States as one great whole; to
confide that sudden impression, when erroneous, would
yield to candid reflection; and to consult only the
substantial and pennanent interests of our country. 2
Such a statement was not mere political rhetoric--it was a sincere
expression of Washington's own political and personal state of mind.
He was a man who could remain singularly unflustered in the face of
apparent calamity:

"Human affairs are always chequered and vicissi-

tudes in this life are rather to be expected than wondered at." Nor
was he prone to make too much of personal and political disagreements,
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for he felt that the same ends were present:

"In this country a

personal difference in political sentiments is often made to take
the garb of general dissentions." At the same time, Washington's own
involvement with the "code of the Virginia gentleman" conditioned
his detached responses to the vicissitudes of life.

A gentleman

should simply be able to rise above petty annoyances:

"The principles

of Philosophy, Moral, Natural etc., I should think a very desirable
knowledge for a Gentleman. 113 This view sustained Washington in his
belief that the dispute between his two Cabinet members could be only
a philosophical one and was healthy for the new govenunent because
it was not personal.

To a man in whom personal reply was almost non-

existent, the idea of a raging dispute between Jefferson and Hamilton
seemed incredible.
This state of personality became part of Washington's political
state of mind, making detachment his chief trait.

The President was

not a man of the people; he held levees only on certain days, returned
no visits, and entertained only "official persons." Members of both
Houses awaited the President at his residence following an address.
He believed that "ceremony was compatible with Republicanism."

In

order to arrive at a final decision, Washington relied on his Cabinet
members for their opinions but was not dominated by the will of any
single man. 4

3.

The Papers of George Washington, 1748-1799, op cit, pp. 397, 406,
409.

4.

John C. ~filler, The Federalist Era, 1789-1801 (New York:
Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 11.

Harper

&

58
Washington's quasi-ministerial consultations comprised a
major part of his political personality.

Jefferson himself noted

that Washington's mind was "great and powerful, without being of the
very first order," and that when called upon for a sudden opinion,
he was "llllready, short and embarrassed. 115 As such Washington became
a reconciler rather than a leader.

Hamilton and Jefferson were

assumed to be able to act independently of the President:

"Nor was

the principal held responsible for these acts of his agents--another
evidence of the almost monarchical detachment of the President at
this time." This behavior was in keeping with Washington's guiding
principle of government--that the U.S. must have a strong central
government if the nation were to keep its freedom.

The President in

turn "must remain detached; his heads of departments . . . must be free
to use their discretion. 116
This habit of consultation and detachment has an obvious
bearing upon the Hamilton-Jefferson dichotomy.

Having no precedents

with which to guide him, he deliberately chose men of opposing
opinions for his Cabinet, for he felt that all men were llllited in
support of the government.

Washington had no idea that he himself

was fostering the development of parties by choosing men with different
ideas as to the means to the goal of a strong central government. 7
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But the President knew of the dangerous grotmd upon which he was
treading:

"Precedents are dangerous things. 118 The entire concept

of party was anathema to Washington, and he saw himself chiefly as the
reconciler of divergent opinions:

"I was not a party man myself,

and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile
them. 119
As

it turned out, the President could not have chosen two

men for advisors with more differences of opinion, both political and
personal.

But Washington did not possess this hindsight view in

1789-93.

He listened to the Cabinet debates between Jefferson and
Hamilton, but did not answer them. 10 In fact, Washington probably
felt that Hamilton's financial policies were solllld, and "yet he kept
his private views carefully concealed and sought to reconcile the
irreconcilable. 1111
This role as mediator was complicated by the fact that
Washington was often away from the nation's capital because it was
among his first detenninations when he "entered upon the duties of my
present station to visit every part of the United States in the course
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of my administration . . . 1112 Washington instructed the Cabinet to
meet in his absences and "in case of important occurances (sic) they
would hold a consultation . . . 1113 Hamilton and Jefferson were often
placed in direct contact by the President in his absence.

Such

Cabinet meetings could only foment controversy and negate the
stabilizing tendency present when Washington himself chaired the
meetings.
Washington's repeated absences and his own personal and
political predilections left him ignorant of the escalating nature
of the dispute.

He was conditioned to finnly believe that Hamilton

and Jefferson would compromise in the end, as they had done in the
assumption crisis.

He wanted to hold "Hamilton and Jefferson together

in his Cabinet as long as he possibly could. . . 1114

In fact until

October, 1792, Washington maintained that he was unaware that there
were any personal differences between Jefferson and Hamilton.

He

urged Jefferson at that time to remain in office "to keep things in
their proper channels.
Washington was in fact a key figure in the Hamilton-Jefferson
rift.

His dependence on the Cabinet spurred disagreement between

the two Secretaries.

This was heightened by Washington's own belief

12.

Washington to Edward Rutledge in The Washington Papers, ed. Saul
K. Padover (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1955), p. 407.

13.

The Diaries
Fitzpatr1

14.

Douglas Southall Freeman , George Washin~ton: A Biography (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), II, 3.

15.

Washington quoted in Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, The
Apostle of Americanism (Boston: Little, Brown, &Co., 1929), p. 271.

·

48-1799, ed. John C.
fl1n Co., 1925), IV, 155-56.
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that he was ill-equipped to be President:

"all I can promise is only

to accomplish that which can be done by an honest zeal," while
recognizing his "own inability to perform" the many flmctions of his
office. 16 His humility, taken together with lack of precedents and
his political and personal views of men and of goveI1lJllent, left
Washington an tmwitting catalytic agent.

His dependence on the

Cabinet gave fire to Hamilton's push for influence; his failure to
speak out made him appear as unsympathetic to Jefferson, who felt
that the President's acceptance of Hamiltonian policies was a danger
to the survival of the republic; his failure to recognize the role
of personality in the confrontation only aided in escalating the
dispute.

He was a man who believed--and wanted to believe--that the

disagreement between his two most important Secretaries was a prelude
to a compromise which would further achieve the goal of a strong,
financially sound, and united national goveITIIllent.

By his own

intellectual make-up he could see his error only when all the evidence
was in.

By that time, the dichotomy lacked all hope of compromise

and was indeed a very personal confrontation.

16.

Washington quoted in J. D. Richardson, Compiler, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents (Washington: Bureau of National
Literature and Art, 1904), p. 42.

GI.APTER FIVE
TI-IE CAUSAL rnAIN DRAWN TIGHT

I

It was a unique combination of ingredients along with their
catalyst which made the split between the two Secretaries an explosive
one and one which became devoid of any potential for lasting reconciliation.

The first ingredient was the lack of lmowledge of economic

matters on the part of Thomas Jefferson.

This lack perpetuated the

Secretary of State's charges of monarchy, which formed his selfinitiated rationale that these charges were indeed true--charges which
he maintained long after Hamilton's death.
was Hamilton's financial expertise.

The second ingredient

His impersonal arguments, rampant

with statistics and tables; his cold logic; his arrogance in dismissing
opposing opinions all excited a hostile public reaction to his
policies.

His aclmowledgement of the English model further alienated

Hamilton from the people.
duplicity.

The third ingredient was Jefferson's

It was a belief of Jefferson's deceit that led Hamilton

to begin his personal attacks.

The fourth ingredient was Hamilton's

inexcusably acerbic replies to Freneau's newspaper editorials.

Indeed

it was Freneau who provided the "link" between personality and politics.
With the fifth ingredient, the catalytic agent of George Washington, the
rift reached combustible proportions.
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II

D..unas Malone stated that Jefferson was little concerned with
finances upon his return to the United States from Paris, but the
Secretary's own writings belie that statement.

In his contacts with

Madison he reflected both an interest in and a lack of knowledge of
the financial proposals of the day.

In answer to the question of

whether the present could bind the future to repayment of its
indebtedness, he replied that "the dead have neither powers nor
rights over it." No man could oblige that debts be paid for him upon
his death.

If this was true, then ''What is true of every member of

society individually, is true of them all collectively.

"

If the

present could bind the future, said Jefferson, then the earth would
belong to the dead.

Here Jefferson employed a French analogy.

He

asked the question:

Would the French be bound by former debts of

Louis XIV to cede territory to Genoese creditors? His answer was
obviously in the negative.

Divine rights devolved "not from their

predecessors, but from nature." At the same time the present generation could deliberatley bind the future if the latter were forced to
pay the debt.

The present generation could squander, knowing that they

would not have to pay for their loose actions.

Here was a moral argu-

ment against a funding system, behind which lay the maxim:

"The earth

belongs always to the living generation." Jefferson's financial
naivete was manifest in his assessment of the U.S. debt in 1789:

"we

do not owe a shilling which may not be paid with ease, principal and
interest, within the time of our own lives. 111

1.

Thomas Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 6> 1789, in The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson 2 ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965), XV, 392-97.
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Jefferson urged Madison to put this principle into Congressional discussion.

To a large extent the letter punctured the

Secretary's later contention that he knew nothing of the financial
discussions going on in goveTillllent circles; but at the same time it
did reveal a profound economic ignorance, and made his later contention
true in its most literal sense.

His connnents also evinced a naive

attitude in implying that no goveTillllent should ever undertake anything
so expensive as to bind the future to pay for it.

By extension only

the present could be provided for so long as it did not cost too much.
Jefferson even declared to Madison that his principle "would furnish
matter for a fine preamble to our first law for appropriating the
public revenue . • . " He was very much aware of the role of debt
solution as precedent; he urged that the new goveTillllent "make a
declaration against the validity of long-contracted debts • . . 112
Jefferson was indeed involved in the financial questions as early as
September, 1789:

unfortunately his knowledge did not match his

interest.
Many of Jefferson's naive assumptions lay in his background
of the romantic "Renaissance Man." His argument was a philosophical
one.

It was almost utopian in nature, and was without practicality.

It also reflected an idealistic conception of goveTillllent.
view was not without support.

Such a

His own connnents on the French

illustrated his perception of the "new order." Here he offered the

2.

Thomas Jefferson to ~1adison, Sept. 6, 1789, in The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965), XV, 397.
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view that divine rights came "from nature," not from precedence.
The new French government, sans King,, could not be bound by debts
from the old order, for nature had retracted her "divine rights."
By extended analogy the United States represented a "new order"
t'

!'

vis a vis Great Britain, and for the new .American nation the old
order was dead.

Alexander Hamilton in seeking to model his policies

on those of England was seeking to deny the "new order" of revolutionary .America.

The revolutions in both France and the United

States had terminated the old historical eras.
establish their own policies.

The new regimes must

Hamilton's practical policies, based

on the British model, were the direct antithesis to Jefferson's
idealistic "new order."
Throughout all of these discussions Jefferson maintained that
he paid no attention to financial matters!

On the issue of a Dutch

loan which Hamilton had negotiated, Jefferson (upon being asked
whether it should be applied in part to purchase of the public debt
or directed in total to the foreign debt) replied that the subject
was not in his department.

Thus he did not have "either the time or

inclination to investigate [it], and on which my opinion is of no
importance. 113 Here Jefferson implied that his lack of knowledge was
deliberate.

Yet, in all of his later damnations of Hamilton and his

policies, he gave no hint of such deliberate "ignorance."

It was

strange indeed for a public man to base his arguments on a lack of
knowledge.

3.

Jefferson to Hamilton, Mar. 27, 1793, in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thanas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903), IX, 57-59.
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III

Whatever the merit of Jefferson's idealized "solution" to
the funding question, it is a certainty that Hamilton's provisions
were a far cry from Jefferson's ideals.

Hamilton's own "Report on

the Public Credit" let loose a deluge of abstruse arguments, impersonal
to the point of offending the masses.

His deluge of details, tables,

and abstruse logic were designed to overwhelm his readers and hence
to gain their acceptance as a result of their confusion.

A brief

examination of the "Report" reveals the intricacy of his arguments,
as well as his utter neglect of prevailing public opinion.

Many of

his arguments centered around the nature of the debt and the role of
a circulating medium.

He asked

whether the public debt, by a prov1s1on for it on true
principles, shall be rendered a substitute for money; or
whether by being left as it is, or by being provided for
in such a manner as will wound those principles, and destroy
confidence, it shall be suffered to continue as it is, a
pernicious drain of our cash from the channels of productive
industry. 4
Such a question would certainly have appeared as sophistry to the
connnon man who still smarted from the inflationary effects of
Continental Currency.

In a like vein were Hamilton's statements

concerning the reason for the decrease in land values, which he
stated "ought, in a great measure, to be attributed to the scarcity
of money." He then related the need for money to "the most decisive
experience in Great Britain." Again Hamilton had acknowledged the

4.

Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative to a Provision for the Support
of the Public Credit," in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed.
Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), VI,
71.
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British model, but in this context it was inauspicious since he
was explaining primarily to the South the profound decrease in their
land values.

Certainly the citizen who was largely ignorant of

the ramifications of Hamilton's arguments was not to be convinced on
the axiom that what had worked for the British would work for the
Americans.

In addition,to an agrarian interest: conditioned both to

condemn paper money and a man of such social origins, such arguments
would appear inflammatory.
At the same time his deluge of tables and statistics confused
and overwhelmed the average reader. · Hamilton's tables in the "Report"
included:

"Suppositious Statement of Accounts Between the United

States and Individual States;" foreign loans and arrears in interests;

"An Estimate of all the Interest which will Accrue on the Domestic
Debt . . . ; 11 and state-by-state accounting.

The "Report" even contained

a "Table Showing the Annuity Which a Person of a Given Age, Would be
Entitled to During Life, From the Time he should arrive at a Given
Age, upon the payment of a hundred dollars, computing interest at
four per cent. 115 While the tables of tonnage and projection of
government expenses and services were vital to such a report, the
above detail could only serve to confound those not acquainted with
intricacies of finance.

No doubt even a few in the business connnunity

were awestruck by same of Hamilton's intricacies.

Hamilton's person-

ality traits of arrogance, compensatory behavior, and ambition were
all present in the "Report"--neither the confused public nor the

5.

Ibid., p. 68-168.
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romantic sensibilities of Thomas Jefferson could tum a responsive
ear to his arguments.

IV
Thomas Jefferson's own personal make-up precluded combatting
Hamilton's policies in a public dispute of any kind in which he himself
had to engage in ungentlemanly verbal abuse, especially with one of
Hamilton's social background.

Hence he engaged in the treachery

connected with the hiring of Philip Freneau which comprised the third
ingredient in the dispute's combustion.
The best argument for the deceit of Jefferson was provided by
the Secretary himself in a letter to l~ashington, -which revealed his
desire to remain behind the scenes and to avoid a confrontation.

This

shadowy work was antithetical to that of Hamilton, ever an exponent of
the direct approach.

In his letter Jefferson claimed that he could not

remember whether Freneau suggested setting up a newspaper at the time
his clerkship position was offered or after.

But the Secretary of State

assured the President that he was not attempting "any kind of influence"
through the National Gazette.

Instead he maintained that he only wanted

to use Freneau to publish State Department intelligence in order to
portray a "juster view of the affairs of Europe" than was found in Fenno's
paper.

He employed Freneau because he saw in him a man "of genius," who

would make a good Translating Clerk. 6 Coincidentally, Freneau' s "genius"

6.

The Best Letters of Thomas Jefferson y ed. J. G. Hamilton (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), pp. 77-78.
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was born of his reputation as the "Poet of the Revolution" and his
anti-British writings in his Philadelphia newspaper.
professed innocence seems highly artificial.

Jefferson's

His very attempts to

evade the charge imply deception.
This behind-the-scenes tactic was a vital factor in the rift
since Hamilton's inability to get at Jefferson plus his belief that
Jefferson was writing articles for Freneau led the Treasury Secretary
to a violent verbal assault.

It was Philip Freneau directly and

Thomas Jefferson more indirectly who occasioned the Hamiltonian response,
for despite his disclaimers Jefferson was both aware of and countenanced
Freneau's attacks upon Hamilton.

In the largest sense Freneau had

charged that Hamilton's influence over Congress was ''more dangerous
than even that which is pursued, but loudly complained of in Britain. 117
Since Freneau was an employee of Jefferson's, the latter could hardly
have failed to notice the stir created by these attacks, especially
after Hamilton replied as ''T. L." and "An .American" in July and
August of 1792.

Therefore although there is no evidence to warrant

postulating that Jefferson actually wrote any of the articles; his
granting to Freneau of State Department material and his failure to
ever chastise him for his emotional attacks upon Hamilton, suggest
that he was far more than merely acquiescent to the character assassination of his colleague.

Jefferson's move was a politically sound

one, for it aided in Hamilton's own ruin as a public figure while
exalting himself.
7.

His actions cannot be challenged on the grounds of

National Gazette~ Apr. 23, 1792, in Claude Bowers, Jefferson and
Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1925), p. 165.

70

expediency.

But those who maintain that Jefferson was a guiltless

bystander must accoilllt for his actions.

The natural trait of shyness,

coupled with the dubious "quality" of cunning, fonned a potent political
personality.
V

This combination, taken together with Hamilton's personality
traits, led to the latter's inexcusably personal replies, which spelled
the direct infusion of personality into the dispute.

The best

indicator is again a letter, from Hamilton to Washington:

"I have not

fortitude enough always to bear with calmness calurrmies, which
necessarily include me. . . '' Al though Freneau' s newspaper articles
comprised the link between personality and politics and led to Hamilton's
direct attacks, they do not of themselves explain the causes of the
direct injection of personality into the feud.
In this letter Hamilton responded to a summary of twenty-one
objections set forth by Jefferson to his policies, in which Hamilton
revealed several important factors concerning his make-up.

The

logical and the rancorous sides of his personality were both present;
his inability to get at Jefferson occasioned violent replies in
defense of his own conduct.
separately.

Hamilton answered each of the criticisms

He responded to the charge that the debt had been

artificially increased by declaring that state debts and public sums
owed were all ll.Ililped together, but this sum had not been added to.
In answer to the charge that plans were afoot in Congress to increase
the debt, Hamilton replied that there would be only the transfer
from the states to the Union certain debts incurred in completing
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asswrrption.

Hamilton's reply to the charge that Bank profits came

out of the peoples ' pockets was also logical.

He answered that

profits came from govenunent payments on interest in Bank stock and
from interest payments from individuals who borrowed.

The first

payment was naturally due to the subscribers and would be due whether
or not there was a Bank since the payments represented part of the
funding of the public debt.
practice.

The second element was a nonnal business

When the govenunent earned profits from its holdings of

one-fifth of the shares, money went into the peoples' pockets.
But in response to the charges as a whole, Hamilton defended
his position and declared that assertions to the contrary betrayed
"extreme ignorance or extreme disingenuousness."

Ironically Hamilton's

allusion to Jefferson here approached the truth, for the latter was
guilty of both a misunderstanding of Hamilton's policies and of
deceit.

But the logic of Hamilton's own statement escaped him, for

its strong taint of emotion left him unable to understand Jefferson's
tactic--only to decry it.

Instead he responded to the charges of

favoring monarchy and aristocracy, by maintaining that "none but
madmen could meditate and that no wise men will believe" in such
charges.
While making these statements, Hamilton offered the belief
that there was a "good deal of middle ground" for differences on
constitutional interpretations.

This statement was strange since

Hamilton's violent attacks were then taking place in the newspapers
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and were hardly cognizant of any "middle ground." 8 Here existed the
logical and the more violent aspects of Hamilton's personality
contending for supremacy, in his answer to strong charges against
his financial system and indeed in his very conception of goveTil1Ilent.
This "split personality" complicated the controversy, for the logical
side of Hamilton allowed Washington to ignore the vituperative side.
"The Defence No. I" on party spirit contained a statement by Hamilton
which nrust have warmed Washington's heart.

His Secretary found

factions a "most dangerous spirit" in popular goveTil1Ilents, causing
"disorders, convulsions, and ttnnults." All TIR1st endeavor to "repress
the spirit of faction." ~n of goveTil1Ilent were not to impute crime
and misconduct to public men where none existed; they must be ready
to excuse "lesser deviations." The patriot could be distinguished
from the partisan by the "matter and from the manner of the attack
which is at any time made. 119 Such views were at a pole opposite those
reflected in the "newspaper war," but were directly in keeping with
those of the President himself.
But George Washington replied only to the logical expositions
of Hamilton, in keeping with his own personality and background which
he projected to his two Cabinet members.

He too folilld a ''middle

ground" even though both sides had "strained the cords beyond their
bearing."

In the face of such factors Washington could only urge

8.

Hamilton to Washington, Aug. 18, 1792, in The &iiEers of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Col ia University
Press, 1965), XII, 228-258.

9.

Alexander Hamilton, "The Defence No. I," Dec., 1792, in The Pa:eers
of Alexander Hamilton , ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965) ~XIII, 393-95.
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"temporizing yieldings on all sides." 10 Hamilton's reply to the
President's restrained plea should have given Washington sufficient
grounds for doubting Hamilton's ability to control his responses.
The Secretary pronounced himself "the deeply injured party," charging
that Jefferson and his followers were ''bent upon my subversion." He
claimed that he had stayed out of direct conflict until he saw that
Jefferson's actions would cause consequences which would "subvert
the government." Yet, Hamilton had already taken up his acid pen
against Jefferson in response to Freneau' s attacks , which had little
directly to do with any motive of Jefferson's concerning subversion
of the government.

TI1e constant repetition of the charges of deceit,

subversion, and personal assault led Hamilton to thoroughly believe
in their truth.

His assertion that he would acquiesce if Washington

could find "sane steady principle of cooperation" was already out of
date. 11 The dispute was already beyond compromise.

VI
Even Jefferson's responses to a similar plea by Washington were
not without traces of personality although on a nruch less emotional
level than those of his colleague.

In mid-1792 he voiced concern over
.,

,

public unrest concerning government policies vis a vis Hamilton.

He

noted that the public mind was "no longer confident and serene." He
10.

Washington to Hamilton, Aug. 26, 1792, in The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1965), XII, 276-77.

11.

Hamilton to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792, The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Colimibia University
Press, 1965), XII, 347-350.
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asserted that the debt was "artificially created," and that paper
speculation was a "means of corrupting the Legislature . . . "
Monarchy was facilitated by a "cornipt squadron of paper dealers"
which comprised a majority in both Houses.

Corniption of the Legis-

lature, said Jefferson, was the most dangerous facet of Hamilton's
programs.

It was an "instnnnent for producing in the future a king,

lords, and connnons . . . 11 Sectional cleavages were brought about by
"monarchical federalists" who would use the government as a "stepping
stone to monarchy. 11
As

a stabilizing element to these disorders, Jefferson urged

Washington to accept another tenn as President.

To Washington he

exclaimed that the "confidence of the whole Union is centred in you,"
evidence that he found Washington's character and charisma a unifying
beacon in a largely disunited America.

Also implied is a confidence

that Washington was not a tool of Hamilton, and that if Washington
would remain in office, the spirit of faction would not be allowed to
predominate. 12 Jefferson gave the President good reason to hope that
a compromise could be effected.
Jefferson's later connnunication did not give Washington this
fond hope for reconciling the dispute; the Secretary of State too
gave vent to personal response.

Jefferson claimed that he did not

want to interfere in the Legislature, but had been "duped" by Hamilton
in the asslUilption bargain.

The charge that he was intriguing in the

Legislature against Hamilton was "contrary to all truth."
12.

In tum,

Jefferson to Washington, May 23, 1792, in The Best Letters of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. J. G. Hamilton (New York: Houghton &
~tifflin, 1926), pp. 62-69.
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his colleague's system flowed from "principles adverse to liberty."
Hamilton desired to create a "king and a house of lords," and desired
never to repay the debt, but instead use it to "corrupt and manage
the Legislature. 1113
VII

In the letters of both men there was ample personal attack to
warrant a stronger response from Washington, as well as a more
realistic one.

The President's own personal make-up and his socio-

political background prevented the necessary remonstrance to his
Cabinet members.

As a result he catalyzed the elements of mistmder-

standing, deceit, expertise, and malevolent responses to fonn a
volatile compotmd of personal attacks and cotmterattacks.

Never again

in the contacts between the two men did such violence occur, either in
the public press or in private correspondence.

Nevertheless a belief

in the veracity of the charges persisted in the form of complex
rationales built up by each man to explain his respective position.
These rationales became more or less pennanent fixtures of their
political philosophies; again personality and politics became fused
in the absence of precedents to the contrary.

13.

Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792, in The Best Letters of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. J. G. Hamilton (New York: Houghton &
Mifflin, 1926), pp. 70-81.

GIAPTER SIX
A MEANINGFUL SYN'IHESIS
After the conditions innnediately surrollllding the dispute had
long disappeared the disputants were still often referring to each
other in highly personal tenns.

The vehicle of these responses was

a complex rationale, more evident in the reactions of Thomas Jefferson.
Once Jefferson had crossed the line of personal rancor, he could not
again return to any measure of objectivity.

His language took on a

remarkably similar tenninology year after year in his referenc~s to
his fonner colleague.

Al though his own personality and background

prevented him from directly confronting Hamilton, his pen compensated
in "behind-the-scenes" attacks.

Ironically it was Hamilton who more

fully returned to a balance between logical and personal response
although the latter was still manifest in certain of his writings
from 1793 until his death in 1804.

Never again did the precise

ingredients of 1792 come together to cause another personality explosion; but never again did the force of personality make a complete
exit from the relations between the two men.
I

After 1792 Alexander Hamilton succeeded in restoring the tenuous
domination of logic in his references to Jefferson.
to forget the impact of 1792.

But he was unable

In April of the following year he saw a

sly cunning in Jefferson's call to a meeting of the Connnissioners of the
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Sinking Ftmd, which included both: :Cabinet members.

Although Jefferson's

annotmced purpose for the call was to secure a declaration from
Hamilton concerning the availability of funds applicable to purchases
of the debt, Hamilton claimed he perceived the "design of this movement."
He expressed the belief that Jefferson intended to renew the attacks
upon his financial policies with ''more system and earnestness. 111
Nevertheless, following Jefferson's exit from the Cabinet in
1793 Hamilton's responses became more indirectly personal.

In 1796

he revealed a fetish for keeping Jefferson out of office, but declared
that "all personal and partial considerations nrust be discarded, and
everything must give way to the great object of excluding Jefferson. 112
One reason for this exclusion was the fact that Hamilton had diffused
his attacks after 1796 in the face of his split with the "Adams
Federalists." For example, in 1797 Hamilton lamented that Adams and
Jefferson headed the Executive:

"Our Jacobins say they are well

pleased and that the lion and the lamb are to lie down together. 11
Hamilton remained skeptical concerning the supposition of many Adams'
Federalists that "'Mr. Jefferson is not half so ill a man as we have
been accustomed to think him. 1113 But with the force of his attacks

1.

Hamilton to Rufus King, Apr. 2, 1793, in The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Coltnnbia University
Press, 1965), XIV, 276.

2.

Hamilton in Alexander Hamilton and the Fotmdin of the Nation, ed.
Richard B. Morris New Yor
e Dial Press, 1957 , p. 525.

3.

Hamilton to King, Feb. 15, 1797, in Alexander Hamilton and the
Fotmdation of the Nation, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: The
Dial Press, 1957), p. 529.
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scattered in two directions, the focus shifted outward from Jefferson
and consequently reduced the effect of those responses.
The most remarkable facet of Hamiltonian response is found in
the period following 1800.

Herein existed the delicate balance of

personal response and logic, leaning slightly to one side then the
other.

Most noteworthy was Hamilton's support of Jefferson in the

1800 election--but only because his opponent was the even more
deceitful and unprincipled Aaron Burr!

lliring the election Hamilton

was approached by several Federalists in the hope of fonning a coalition
against Jefferson by supporting Burr in the House election.

Although

admitting that Jefferson was "crafty and persevering in his objects;
that he is not scrupulous about the means of success, nor very mindful
of truth, and that he is a contemptible hypocrite,1' Hamilton found
Burr "inferior in real ability to Jefferson. 4 In fact, said Hamilton,
11

Burr was "as unprincipled and dangerous a man as any country can
boast--as true a Catiline as ever met in midnight conclave. 115

In the

face of these considerations Hamilton was ready to make a remarkable
pronouncement:

"To contribute to the disappointment and mortification

of Mr. J. , would be, on my part, only to retaliate for unequivocal
proofs of enmity. 116

In these statements Hamilton revealed that he had

4.

Hamilton to Bayard, Jan. 16, 1801, in Alexander Hamilton and the
Foundation of the Nation, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: The
Dial Press, 1957), pp. 540-41.

5.

Hamilton to Bayard, Aug. 6, 1800, in Alexander Hamilton and the
Foundation of the Nation, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: The
Dial Press, 1957), p. 536.

6.

Hamilton to Bayard, Dec. 27, 1800, in Alexander Hamilton and the
Foundation of the Nation, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: The
Dial Press, 1957), p. 539.

79
not forgotten the dispute of 1792; that he remembered his own past
charges and had become a victim of their repetition; and that he
still judged Jefferson a highly contemptible person.

But more

important is the fact that despite his own personal feelings concerning
Jefferson he could nevertheless believe that he was the more principled
and hence the better man for the Presidency in 1800.

He would have

no part of the cabal to elect Aaron Burr:
If there be a man in the world I ought to hate, it is
Jefferson. With Burr I have always been personally well.
But the public good must be paramount to every private
consideration. 7
Hamilton could, in 1800, rationally note that personality had
been the principal dividing line in the earlier confrontation.

Removed

from the innnediacy of that dispute he could make personality subservient to political considerations.

Though he still danmed Jefferson

in strong language, he could in turn shunt his own personal feelings
aside in rejecting the even more odious Burr.

For at least Jefferson

was motivated by the national good; Burr sought only the ends of
Aaron Burr.

If his support of Jefferson was backhanded, it was nonethe-

less sincere.
The delicate balance of personal response and logic at times
still inclined to the former.

In December of 1801 Hamilton harkened

back to 1792 in assuming the pseudonym of "Lucius Crassus," in which
he derided the Presidential decision not to actively wage war on
French vessels preying upon neutral American ships:

7.

Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, Dec. 26, 1800, in Broadus Mitchell,
Alexander Hamilton, The National Adventure 1788-1804 (New York:
~1acmillan Co., 1962), II, 491.
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Who could restrain the laugh of a derision at positions
so preposterous, were it not for the reflection that in the
first magistrate of our cotm.try they cast a blemish on our
national character? What will the world think of the fold
when such is the shepherd?8
Yet, even in this attack Hamilton did not stoop to direct personal
attack, for he in no way impugned Jefferson's character--only his
political foresight.

The vehemence of the attack and the pseudonym

were reminiscent of the attacks of 1792, but the logical side of his
nature still possessed enough force to prevent the next step of personal
denigration.

He was a concerned public citizen, who at this time was

outside the inner circle of government.

His own need to make himself

heard was present; a loss of control was not.
II

Thomas Jefferson, however, became much more a victim of his
own charges.

He believed in the veracity of his indictments even after

his own Presidency, and long after Hamilton's death.

Jefferson's

charges continued to focus upon Hamilton's monarchical tendencies, his
love for things British , his supposed use of corruption in running
government, and his general political disposition.

As trouble flared

between Great Britain and France, Jefferson accused Hamilton of being
"for proclaiming the most abject principles, such as wruld invite and

8.

Alexander Hamilton, "Lucius Crassus No. I," Dec. 17, 1801, in
Alexander Hamilton and the Fotm.ding of the Nation, ed. Richard B.
Morris (New York: The Dial Press, 1957), p. 527.
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merit habitual insults. 119 In July of 1793 Jefferson uniquely acknowledged that personal dislike of Hamilton was behind Virginia's opposition
to the Treasury Secretary:

"the whole indisposition there is directed

against the Secretary of the Treasury personally, not against his
measures. 1110 The "Virginia Code's" contempt of Hamilton's origins,
methods, and political behavior were strongly implied in this assessment.
The construction of Jefferson's rationale concerning Hamilton
was a continuous process, in effect compensatory behavior for being
unable to return Hamilton's volleys personally.

In 1793 Jefferson

claimed that he had kept himself "aloof from all cabal and correspondence
on the subject of the government." Yet, a coalition between the two men
was "impossible" if either had to sacrifice his general system. 11 At
this early date he considered himself the innocent victim of the
monarchical Hamilton.

In 1795 he elaborated on his position:

"Hamilton

is really a colossus to the anti-republican party. Without ntnnbers he
is a host within himself. 1112 In the same year he accused Hamilton of
deliberately intending to render his financial policies "utterly

9.

Jefferson to James Monroe, May 5, 1793, in The Writing of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscanb (Washington: The Jefferson
.Memorial Association, 1903), IX, 76.

10.

Jefferson to ~1adison, July 21, 1793, in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903), IX, 169.

11.

The Jeffersonian
&Russell, 1967,

12.

Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 21, 1795, in The Writings of Thanas
Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscanb (Washington: Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903), IX, 309.

ed., .J. P. Foley (New York:
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undecipherable" to Congress, the President, and Jefferson himself. 13
This charge he more strongly repeated in 1802 to Gallatin, stating
that with respect to his financial system, Hamilton "determined so to
complicate it as that neither the President nor Congress should be
able to understand it, or to control 'him." His object was to involve
his whole system in an "unpenitrable fog"--a direct restatement of his
1795 charge.

He further charged that the Secretary had made the

Treasury Department his bastion, taking "his own stand as Lt. General,
surrounded by his Major General, and stationing his Brigadiers and
Colonels under the name of Supervisors, Inspectors, in the different
States. 1114
That these charges were in the form of rationale is supported
by two closely related factors.

One is that Jefferson continued such

charges far beyond Hamilton's death.

The other is the repetition of

the monarchy charges in extraordinarily similar language.

Following

Hamilton's death Jefferson had nothing to fear from the man himself,
but Jefferson acted as though the spectre of Hamilton was a force
which could never be effaced from the .American political scene--the
truth of which even Jefferson could not foresee.

In 1811 Jefferson

stated that Hamilton believed "in the necessity of either force or

13.

Jefferson to Madison, 1795, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
ed . .Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Association, 1903), IX, 323.

14.

Jefferson to Gallatin, Apr. 1, 1802, in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. .Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washingto~ Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903), X, 306-309.
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corruption to govern men. 1115 But an even more potent reminder of the
impression made upon Jefferson was the latter's references to Hamilton's
fetish for the British constitution.

During Washington's second

administration Jefferson had invited Hamilton and Adams to dinner.
Following the meal Adams made the remark that were the British constitution divested of its inequities and vices, it would be an ideal
document.

Hamilton rejoined that the constitution was already the

best such document that could spring from the mind of man and that
without its vices \'Kluld be an impracticable instrument.

Jefferson

repeated this incident no less than four times in ensuing years.

In

1825 he went so far as to proclaim that Hamilton had stated that the

British constitution was an unqualified "perfect" document. 16

In

each of these responses Jefferson ignored the fact that Hamilton had
also stated that it W)Uld be "visionary" to think of introducing
monarchy in America.

Jefferson admitted this additional conment

by his former colleague only once, and was then quite cynical of its
veracity. 17
To Jefferson it was this ad11erence to things British which
made Hamilton so politically perverse.

In 1816 he wrote that Hamilton's

15.

Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, Jan. 16, 1811, in The Writi~s of
Thomas Jefferson, ~d~ Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington:
omas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), XIII, 4.

16.

Jefferson to Samuel Short, January 8, 1825; to Benjamin Rush,
Jan. 16, 1811; to Walter Jones, Jan. 2, 1814, in The Writifts
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington:
omas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), XVI, 93.

17.

Jefferson to Martin Van Buren, June 29, 1824, in The Writi~s
of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington:
omas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), XVI, 66.
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"mind was really powerful, but chained by native partialities to
everything English. 1118 In 1818 he stated that Hamil ton had been
honest in all private actions, but "so bewitched and perverted by the
British example, as to be under thorough conviction that corruption
was essential to the govermnent of a nation,"--a concise presentation
of the whole corpus of Jeffersonian charges.

His misunderstanding of

Hamilton's intentions was always at the fore of his assertions.

In

1818 he remarked that his former colleague's system had two objects.
One was a "puzzle" in order to "exclude popular understanding and
inquiry." The other was to serve as a "machine for corruption of
the legislature. 1119
A consistent pattern emerges from these writings and statements.
First, the charges themselves were consistent:

monarchism; subservience

to the British financial and political system; and employment of
corruption in govermnent.

At the same time Jefferson was always

careful not to impugn Hamilton's personal honesty.

This was in part

a reflection of the "Virginia Code," but it was more evocative of
the fact that Hamilton died in 1804 virtually a pauper.

Nevertheless,

Jefferson maintained that Hamilton had "duped" him in his policies
and that he had not understood the "true" aim of his colleague's
programs and reports.

Of course it must be remembered that Jefferson

was always conscious of his attempt to justify his actions to
posterity.

To what degree he actually believed his charges in 1791-93

18.

Jefferson to William Crawford in Democragy, ed. Saul K. Padover
(New York: D. .Appleton-Century Co., 1939, Appendix II, p. 271.

19.
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is a moot point.

The result of continued repetition was a marked

similarity of actual language over the years.
III
TI1is pattern is supported by Jefferson's post-mortem writings
concerning the role of Washington.
dent erred "with integrity."

In 1795 he stated that the Presi-

In 1797 he stated that Washington was

fortunate to get out of office when he did since the bubble was
bursting, "leaving others to hold the bag. 1120 However, in 1798 he
modified this statement to place the figure of Hamilton behind the
alleged national ills.

For "it was the irresistible influence and

popularity of General Washington, played off by the ctmning of
Hamilton, which turned the government over to anti-republican hands. 1121
Jefferson did not mean by this accusation that Washington was
a tool of Hamilton.

He found that with respect to decisions, "no

judgment was ever sounder" than Washington's.

The President withheld

judgment until sure of his action and then followed through with his
decision "whatever obstacles opposed. 1122 However, in 1824 Jefferson
asserted that Hamilton had "deluded" Washington--a fine line of
distinction implying that Washington was an unknowing accomplice to

20.

The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia, ed. J.P. Foley (New York:
Russell, 1967), II, 928.

Russell

21.

Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, Jan. 14, 1798, in The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903) , XVIII, 207.

22.
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Russell, 1967), II , 928.
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Hamilton's designs. 23 After the retirement of the first Cabinet, the
President "had no opportunity of hearing both sides of any question."
This "separated him still further from his real friends." Again in
1818 Jefferson stated that Washington "was not aware of the drift or
effect of Hamilton's schemes. 1124 These remarks indicate that Jefferson
was imputing the same kind of "duping" to Washington as had been
corrnnitted against himself.

He was projecting his own misconceptions

to the former President.
As Jefferson moved away in time from Washington's first administration, he increasingly asserted that the former President was
"deluded" by Hamilton.

But Jefferson was still careful to keep

Washington's character intact; that character still had a great deal
of charismatic force long after his death.
to attack such a man.

Jefferson could ill-afford

Only his 1797 letter belied this, and this was

most likely the result of partisan rhetoric and Jefferson's potent
concerns of the moment.

His contemporary statements support the

larger motif of ascribing the blame to Hamilton's programs, despite
Washington's approval of them.

IV
But one vital question remains to be answered concerning the
force of personality in the relations between Jefferson and Hamilton.
If rationales were truly present after 1793 and if personal responses
were at least implicit in many statements made by the adversaries,
23.

Ibid., p. 929.

24.

Ibid. , p. 931.
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then why did not a violent dispute again break out over vital issues?
The two men were divided in the 1796 election; for a time they were
divided on the person of Citizen Genet; and they were distinctly at
odds over the foreign policy position of the Washington and Adams'
administrations on Franco-British relations.

The declarations of both

men revealed many of the same tendencies present in 1792.
The answer to this question rests on several tenets.
the explanations developed, especially by Jefferson.

One is

A rationale by

its repetitive nature may reflect strong charges, but the overworked
language of the statements themselves tends to diminish the actual
force behind them.

Second, upon reflection Hamilton must certainly

have been aware that his own harsh replies of 1792 had cost him a good
deal of political influence, a lesson reinforced by his later aspersions against Adams and his subsequent loss of influence even within
his own party.

Third, with Jefferson's exit from the Cabinet in 1793

the physical distance between the two men was greatly extended and
they no longer had to be exposed to painful personal associations in
Cabinet meetings.

Fourth, Jefferson himself threw off Genet when the

latter snubbed Washington and became overzealous in fitting out French
privateers in American ports for the French revolutionary cause.

This

action brought Jefferson closer to Hamilton's own repugnance for Genet.
Fifth, Freneau's newspaper attacks were no longer a factor against
Hamilton, for financial difficulties caused suspension of publication
of the National Gazette in October, 1793.

Sixth, Jefferson was more

careful than ever to keep his more acrimonious remarks out of public
print.

In his letter to Pendleton in 1798, which accused Hannnilton of

"cunning," he admonished his correspondent not to allow Jefferson's
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words beyond the two men, for "a sentence got hold of by the Porcupines,
will suffer to abuse and persecute me in their papers for months. 1125
But finally, and most important, is the fact that never again
following 1792 did the ingredients of that year coalesce in a combination strong enough to move Jefferson to extreme duplicity or Hamilton
to personal denigration.

Washington was no longer President after

1796; Hamilton's political attacks were diffused, extending to the
Adam's Federalists in 1796 and to Burr in 1800.
Jefferson in 1800 curbed his acid pen.

His very support of

While the violent responses of

1792 were unique, their impact continued in the statements, correspondence, and rationales of the two men--in Hamilton lilltil his death
in 1804 and in Jefferson lilltil 1825, more than thirty years following
the controversy and twenty years after his adversary's death.
V

It is an inescapable conclusion that personality played a
dominant role in the confrontation between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas
Jefferson.

A measure of its force is the duration of its impact, a

factor which goes far in explaining why the controversy has achieved
such symbolic heights in historical treatments.

Yet, almost all

authorities have agreed on the basic personality traits of the two
men, indicating that such traits are readily identifiable.

But the

same authors generally have refused to extend the data of personality
to the dispute itself.
25.

The reasons for this are legion, centering on

Jefferson to Pendleton, Jan. 14, 1798, in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 1903), XVIII, 209.
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questions of the boundaries of a historical study, the lack of "proof"
for many assertions concerning motive, the preoccupation with contemporary rhetoric and a subsequent dealing in symbols.

Whatever the

reasons, none are legitimate save those which preclude a detailed
description of the dispute because it is simply not germane to a
given author's subject matter and theme.
No balanced view of the controversy can be achieved without a
re-evaluation of the primary data of the dispute.

The political and

economic issues alone did not occasion an irreparable rift.

At the

same time Hamilton's tendency toward personal denigration was present
even without Freneau's newspaper attacks; there was always an inner
conflict between the logical and personal sides of Hamilton's personality.

Such factors were manifest in the public correspondence,

private letters, and in the general writings of the period.
The Hamilton-Jefferson dichotomy was far different from a symbolic
struggle between rule by the few and rule by the many; far more complex
than one man's alleged attempt to create a monarchy and the other's determined opposition; and far more than the "inevitable" clash between men of
distinct characters and political philosophies.

In the face of a lack of

firm precedents and party structure, the split revealed that two men of
such distinct personalities and backgrounds could not separate personality
from politics.

The dispute was political, constitutional, and economic--

but it was also highly personal.

Personal vehemence must be assigned a

prominent role in the explanation of the dispute's bitterness in 1792.
the last analysis personal response was a vital factor in the impasse
between two men whose names have become synonymous with larger political
philosophies.

Men may become symbols, but even in that achievement they

are first--and foremost--men.

In
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